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Abstract
The development of effective community, regional and national risk-management strategies, especially
for systemic risks, such as natural disasters, entails understanding the determinants of social vulnerability
in individuals and groups, and the factors that foster the adoption of specific mechanisms of risk-
management and, thus, the elements that supports an efficient implementation process. This thesis
contributes to this understanding in the context of communities in developing countries by using data
from surveys conducted in the district of Kalahandi, state of Orissa, India, and three municipalities in
Mexico, each with a different level of socioeconomic development: Villaflores, Chiapas; Ahome, Sinaloa;
and Valle de Santiago, Guanajuato. Using regression modeling of binary response variables, I tested the
statistical association between the adoption of formal social risk-management and a number of
endogenous and exogenous household characteristics. The results indicate that the likelihood of adoption
of formal risk-management strategies increases with the level of the household's association, i.e., its
affiliation with local groups; in addition, proximity to roads, financial services and urban-mixed use areas
(markets), is less strongly correlated with the likelihood of adoption of risk-management strategies than
the level of association, particularly in less-developed environments. These findings are robust to a
variety of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and environmental contexts.
Keywords: risk, social risk management, social capital, vulnerability
Thesis Supervisor: Diane Davis, Professor of Political Sociology. DUSP. MIT
Thesis Reader: Roberto Rigobon, Professor of Economics. Sloan School of Management. MIT
Acknowledgments
This work -and my research in general, has had an outstanding guidance in Diane Davis who has been more
than an academic and thesis advisor since I came to the MIT -she has been a very close friend. Among many
things, she gave me the exciting opportunity of rediscovering Mexico City and its communities.
When I walked in Roberto Rigobon's office, I had only an overambitious research project and 100 pounds of
optimism in my backpack. From scratch, step by step, he helped me with incredible patience to define this
research and shape my scope on the topic of social risk management as a tool for economic development.
I thank to the people from what we know as poor places, such as Kalahandi, Orissa, and Villaflores, Chiapas,
for the invaluable lesson regarding the factors that the development sector must consider when implementing
poor alleviation strategies in such places. Living with them for a short period fueled my curiosity about the
relationship between economic development and that strange variable so-called happiness.
I recognize the support of those organizations that bestowed their confidence in me: the Joint-Japan Inter-
American Development Bank, the National Council for Science and Technology (Mexico) and the Mexico's
Ministry of Education. My research was carried out with the cooperation of Agroasemex (Mexico) and the
Center for Insurance and Risk Management (at the IFMR, India). This thesis was completed with the Public
Service Center Grant, the William Emerson Travel Grant and the Anthony and Rosina Sun Fellowship
Award. I am grateful to the people in these organizations that believed in my project.
Two years ago, I packed my life and left my five-year story in capital markets hung on the graphs of a
financial derivative for the good. This life-changing experience started when I decided to pursue my
interpretation of what my country and other developing countries need -an idea that has been evolving
during my stay at the MIT. I would diminish this experience by trying to sum up in a few sentences what the
challenging conversations with my professors and the MIT's multidisciplinary learning environment have
meant to me, not only in terms of my research and my professional aspirations, but also, and mainly, in terms
of my personal growth. Rather, I only provide a humble evidence for the reader: to strive for reaching one's
dreams is never simple; it entails a permanent interior battle that is worthwhile, perhaps more than the dream
itself.
I dedicated this thesis to Mexico, whose time is now.
To Esperanza -my hope, my backbone, my grandmother.
To my mother and my aunt Carmela.
To Leticia -not a second mother, but a first in many aspects of life.
I do not dedicate this thesis to Renata, since, to her, I have decided to dedicate mi entire life.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments..................................................................................................... ........... 4
Introduction ............................................................................................................... .......... 7
1. Vulnerability as a Determinant of Risk.................................................................. 14
1.1 V ulnerability ............................................................................................................................... 14
1.1.1 Vulnerability and poverty ............................................................................................. 16
1.2 Hazard, the disruptive event.................................................................................................. 17
1.3 Risk, its elements and forms ................................................................................................. 18
2. The Role of Social Risk M anagement .................................................... 20
2.1 Different facets of social risk management............................................. ................... 20
2.1.1 What is formal risk management and what are its advantages vis-a-vis informal strategies?
21
2.1.2 Temporarily of the mechanism: ex-ante or ex-post risk management ............................. 23
2.1.3 Focus of the mechanism: human-related factors, environmental factors ......................... 24
2.1.4 Supply-side factors hampering the grow of the formal risk management market ............. 26
3. Research Design and Preliminary Analyses.................. .. ..... ................ 29
3.1 The research at a glance ........................................................................................................ 29
3.1.1 The surveys' instrument................................................................................................30
3.1.2 Data organization and assumptions regarding the research question............................. 31
3.1.2.1 The dependent variable -Adoption of SRM .................................... ........... 31
3.1.2.2 Key notes on some of the explanatory variables........................... ............ 33
3.2 Study in India- Description ................................................................................................... 35
3.2.1 Methodology ............................................................................................................. 36
3.2.1.1 Data collection .............................................................................................................. 36
3.2.1.1.2 The survey........................................................................................................................... 37
3.2.1.2 Data analysis ............................................................................................................ 38
3.2.2 The district. Kalahandi, Orissa.................................................................................. 
.39
3.3 Study in Mexico -Description ................................................................................................. 40
3.3.2 Methodology ................................................................................................................. 41
3.3.2.1 Data collection .............................................................................................................. 41
3.3.2.1.2 The surveys ................................................................................................................... 43
3.3.2.2 D ata analysis .................................................................................. ........................... 45
3.3.3 The municipalities. Ahome, Sinaloa; Valle de Santiago, Guanajuato; and Villaflores,
Chiapas 46
4. Summary of Findings and Analysis .......................................................... .................. 49
4.1 Study in India .............................................................. ............. 49
4.1.1 D escriptive statistics............................................... ..... .................................... 49
4.1.1.1 Socioeconomic and demographic profile ......................... ............... 49
4.1.1.2 Shocks and SR M profile ................................................................................................... 50
4.1.2 T est of association............................................................. ........................................... 51
4.2 Study in M exico ... ............................................................. ........................................ 53
4.2.1 D escriptive statistics............................................................. ......................................... 53
4.2.1.1 Ahom e, Sinaloa .................................................... 57
4.2.1.1.1 Socioeconomic and demographic profile.................................................... 57
4.2.1.1.2 Shocks and SR M profile ............................................................ ..................................... 58
4.2.1.2 Valle de Santiago, Guanajuato.............................. ........................ 60
4.2.1.2.1 Socioeconomic and demographic profile....................... ............................. 60
4.2.1.2.2 Hazards and SRM profile............................................................61
4.2.1.3 Villaflores, Chiapas................................................................................. 63
4.2.1.3.1 Socioeconomic and demographic profile.............................. ............................... 63
4.2.1.3.2 Shocks and SRM profile ............................................ ............................... 64
4.2.2 Tests of association ................................................................................ 65
4.2.2.1 Ahom e, Sinaloa .......... ................ ... .............. ....... ................................. 66
4.2.2.2 V alle de Santiago, Guanajuato............................................. ......................................... 67
4.2.2.3 V illaflores, Chiapas ....................... ...... . ............... ................................... 67
5. C onclusions..................... ................................................................................................. 69
5.1 The level of development of the community and the effect of the household association in the
adoption of form al SR M .................................................................................................................. 70
5.1.1 A note on the role of informal risk management ............................. 71
5.2 Some points for further research............................................................72
A n n ex es.......................... ...... ................................................................................................. 7 5
Index of Tables, Figures and Equations........................... ................................................. 103
B ibliography ............................................................. ............................................... 108
Introduction
The impact of systemic hazards is increasing; formal risk management
adoption is not
According to the International Emergency Disasters Database' and the International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction 2 , the frequency, duration and magnitude of natural hazards have increased
over the last 40 years; for example, the UNDP (2004) reports that annual economic losses
associated with natural disasters averaged 75.5 USD billion in the 1960s, 138.4 USD billion in
the 1970, 213.9 USD billion in the 1980s and 659.9 USD billion in the 1990s. Factors such as
environmental degradation, establishment of human settlements in danger zones, and
immigration to urban areas, which diminish people's ability to prevent, cope with, and withstand
disruptive events' effects, are the driving forces behind the growing impact of disasters (Cutter
2006, GTZ 2005, Hoppe 2006). In particular, countries of low and medium development status3
are particularly vulnerable. They account for 85 percent of the people vulnerable to cyclones,
droughts, floods, and earthquakes; between 1980 and 2000, an average of 184 deaths per day
related to natural hazards was recorded, 53 percent of them occurred in countries with low-
development level (UNDP 2004). In terms of post-disaster recovery, economic losses due to
natural disasters are 20 times greater (as a percent of GDP) in developing countries than in
developed countries (CRED 2008). In addition, other idiosyncratic disruptive events, such as
health shocks, are among the biggest and least predictable forms of uncertainty that a poor family
1(CRED 2008).
2 (Guha-Sapir, Hargitt y Hoyois 2004)and (ISDR 2008)
3 Based on the Human Development Index (UNDP 2004).
faces (Gertler y Gruber 2002) whose the consequences of can deplete their assets, pushing them
deeper into poverty (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000).
Whether a hazard becomes a disaster or not depends ultimately on people's vulnerability (Cutter
2006), that is, their ability to prevent, mitigate, cope with, and recover from the impact of a
disruptive event. The determinants of vulnerability include people's demographic, social and
economic characteristics, and their relationship with the natural and manmade environment.
Risk-management strategies can help by expanding people's capacity to overcome disturbances
and minimize the losses to health, livelihoods, and assets (Holzmann 2000, GTZ 2005). In
particular, social risk management (SRM) aims to reduce vulnerability through collective action
in a community or region, for example, by providing access to social assets, economic
opportunities, and risk-response solutions.
Risk-management strategies can be classified as formal or informal, depending on the way they
are provided, adopted, and operated. I understand formal risk-management strategies to be
market-based instruments generally provided by or linked to an external agent. I focus on formal
risk management strategies and the factors that promote the likelihood of its adoption because
they are generally more efficient than informal mechanisms at mitigating, coping with, and
recovering from the impact of systemic hazards such as natural events (J. Skees 2004, Hazell and
Miranda 1999, Allianz AG, GTZ and UNDP 2006). When a household suffers an idiosyncratic
shock like a house fire or a chronic disease, two family members with similar socioeconomic
characteristics and hazards exposure can combine incomes and mitigate the impact on
household's welfare. Conversely, when hazards are systemic, the benefit of pooling incomes for
managing risk disappears (Skees, Varangis, et al. 2002). For individuals or groups with no access
to formal risk-management mechanisms, such as insurance or economic infrastructure,
continuous shocks may lower consumption in the short term (Townsend 1994) or decrease
economic development in the medium and long term (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1984,
Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1994).
Despite its advantages over informal mechanisms, formal SRM is not widespread in the
developing world. For example, only 1 percent of households in rural India were estimated to
have health insurance policies in 2006 (Duflo and Barnerjee 2007), and the penetration rate of
the entire insurance sector in Mexico was a mere 2 percent in 2007 (Aguilera 2008). Some
research has explored the low adoption of formal SRM in developing countries, and statements
like communities with higher level of economic development are more likely to adopt formal
risk-response mechanisms appear frequently in the literature.4 However, such statements become
more complicated to support in the face of communities with similar economic standards but
dissimilar rates of adoption of formal SRM (Anderson, 2005). Indeed, there is very little
systematic evidence about the factors that hamper or fuel the adoption of formal risk
management strategies. Furthermore, descriptive data on vulnerability and its relationship to risk
and SRM are rare internationally and especially for the developing world. In the meantime,
governments, multinational agencies, and private companies struggle to define new strategies to
bring risk-response alternatives to households in developing countries.
Research goal and contribution to the field
This thesis contributes to the field of social risk management by identifying and analyzing the
factors, i.e., socioeconomic characteristics, organizational structures, and household
idiosyncrasies that drive people in developing countries to adopt a specific risk-management
4 For further reference see (Allianz AG, GTZ and UNDP 2006), (Bebbington 1999), (Kaplow 1991), (Quah 2002) and(Wenner and Arias 2003).
strategy. Specifically, I explore why some households in developing countries have opted into a
formal mechanism (e.g., insurance), while others have not. Based on the literature5 and my
personal experience 6 I focus on two possible factors: (1) the household's affiliation with local
groups, and (2) its access to economic infrastructure, such as roads, urban mixed-use areas, and
financial services. Understanding these issues becomes a crucial step in evaluating SRM
programs, given that the adoption of these practices is endogenous. My research aims to be a
reference for guiding the design and implementation of new strategies and social systems of risk
hedging by highlighting the elements that can improve the likelihood of their adoption by
households in developing countries. Additionally, it is the first step toward further understanding
the effects of these programs on community development among the poor and assessing the
advantages and disadvantages of specific risk-response mechanisms for poverty reduction.
Methodology
Sites selection
In pursuing my research goal, I carried out quasi-experimental studies in communities in India
and Mexico. These countries were selected for two main reasons:
i. Their level of proneness to natural disasters. India and Mexico have been among the top ten
countries with a high percentage of the population exposed to earthquakes, floods, droughts, and
tropical cyclones in the last three decades (OFDA/CRED 2008). Mexico has experienced 27
earthquakes of magnitude greater than 7.5 on the Richter scale between 1900 and 2008, more
than any other country in the world (Guha-Sapir, Hargitt and Hoyois 2004).
s See for example (Holzmann 2000) (Policy Integration and Analysis Branch 2007) (Osbahr and Few 2006) (Saegert,
Thompson and Warren 2002)
6 It refers to my research on microinsurance in two states of India during 2007.
ii. Their international importance in the innovation of SRM systems. Mexico was the first
developing country to transact a weather derivative (Environmental Finance 2002) and an
earthquake catastrophic bond (L6pez 2006), and both countries led the developing world in the
application of index-based instruments to insurance primary sector activities.
Data collection
This study's cornerstones are statistical surveys conducted at the household level in selected
communities of each country. In the questionnaire, one module describes the socioeconomic and
demographic profile of the household and one module describes the hazard exposure -measuring
event frequency and depth - and the risk management profile. I conducted two surveys in the
district of Kalahandi in the state of Orissa, India , considered as one of the less economically
developed districts of one of the poorest states in India (PCSW n.d., Directorate of Census 2002).
In Mexico, I surveyed three municipalities: Villaflores in the state of Chiapas, Valle de Santiago
in Guanajuato, and Ahome in Sinaloa. These three places were evaluated and selected taking
into account two measurements of economic and social development to integrate into the study a
diversity of socioeconomic, demographic and environmental realities framed by their spatial
distribution in the Mexican geography. With both studies I intended to enrich the analyses with a
wider range of socioeconomic, demographic, and environmental contexts rather than present a
comparative series of cases.
Data analyses
Finally, I analyzed the data for testing the association between the adoption of formal SRM and a
number of household characteristics by using regression modeling of binary response variables
(i.e., a Probit test). Based on the results, it is possible to infer a statistical relationship between
the adoption of (formal) SRM strategies and the level of association of the household -i.e., its
affiliation with local informally or formally constituted (economic or social) groups. Moreover,
the empirical evidence suggests that the effect of the level of association is negatively
proportional to the level of socioeconomic development; that is, the existence of social networks
inside the community has more impact on poorer environments. Additionally, the effect of
availability of economic infrastructure -i.e., proximity to roads, financial services, and urban
mixed-use areas- on the same variable is relatively low and its effect on the household's decision
to adopt SRM strategies is estimated to be positively proportional to the community's level of
socioeconomic development. The less developed the community is, the lower the effect of
availability of infrastructure on the level of implementation of formal SRM mechanisms. These
findings are robust to a variety of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and
environmental contexts.
These results are relevant information for decision making in the area of vulnerability reduction
and the provision of SRM solutions in developing countries. On the one hand, they stress the
importance of social capital not only as a mechanism of risk-management itself, but also as a key
factor for establishing ex-ante strategies for mitigating or coping with the effects of disruptive
events. On the other hand, the statement that the lack of infrastructure is not a necessary
condition for the successful implementation and adoption of SRM systems brings more
opportunities in this field for less developed areas, which generally are both infrastructurally
depressed and in major need of systems for managing the impact of natural disasters and other
systemic shocks.
This document is organized in five main chapters. Chapters one and two contextualize the study
theoretically with a literature review of the concepts of risk as a function of vulnerability and
hazard, and social risk management. Chapter three presents the data collection and analysis, and
Chapter four presents the main results of both studies. Finally, Chapter five houses conclusions
and final discussions regarding the development of systems of SRM in light of the learning
process that this research represented.
1. Vulnerability as a Determinant of Risk
1.1 Vulnerability
There is no consensus on the concept of vulnerability rather than common elements that emerged
from its definition by different social and natural sciences authors. A portion of the economic
and sociological literatures outline vulnerability as a function of risk -the latter generally defined
as a shock or hazard. For instance, Alwang, Siegel and Jorgensen (2001), in their literature
review, conclude that social vulnerability has three basic components: the risk event, the
mechanisms for managing risk and the impact in terms of welfare loss. In this sense, the degree
of vulnerability would be directly proportional to the magnitude and depth of the disruptive
event. On the contrary, I argue that risk is determined by vulnerability -1) endogenous factors of
the household and its relationship with the natural and built environment, and 2) disruptive
events -exogenous factors. I justify this assertion based on the following considerations:
1. Not every community is vulnerable, but every community faces risks. Some
communities are vulnerable due to their inability to manage risk. Despite the fact that a
household can be more or less hazard-prone due to its socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics, systemic hazards are endogenous and inevitable . However, disaster risk
is avoidable or mitigated through appropriate policy and actions.
2. Understanding vulnerability as a consequence of risk implies that a household or group
affected by hazards will be vulnerable regardless any action taken to improve their
7 See 2.2.for description of risks.
8 However, historic human processes, such as environmental degradation, affect their frequency, duration and
magnitude.
situation, when several experiences teach us that vulnerability can be effectively reduced
or eliminated by the adoption of risk management strategies (Skees 2004). For example,
an irrigation system might help to improve the situation of a community during dry
season.
3. The disruptive event is a phenomenon, whilst the (in)ability of people to manage risk
(with no welfare losses) is a pre-existing condition (Cutter 2006) that remains unaltered
beyond their exposure to this phenomenon if their socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics and environmental context continue to be the same. Even if a poor
community faces few systemic hazards, it has, ceteris paribus9, higher likelihood to suffer
losses in welfare from a shock than a community with better socioeconomic standards
does. In this sense, some strategies might help decrease risk exposure: when a community
is relocated off a flood-prone area, its vulnerability is affected due to changes in its
environmental context.
Therefore, for the purposes of this research, vulnerability is understood as the human condition
of inability to prevent, mitigate, cope with, and/or recover from the impact of a disruptive
event10 . It is determined by the actual situation and historic evolution of 1) the demographic,
social and economic characteristics of an individual or group, and 2) their (natural and built)
environmental context . These two dimensions move across the range of variables such as
gender, age, physical and health status, institutions, livelihoods, and social and economic
Later in this chapter, I analyze how poverty and vulnerability are not necessarily related.
1o Following this conceptualization, resilience is the ability to mitigate, resist and recover from a shock.
11 The sustainable livelihood literature (which has been adopted by a number of multinational agencies like CARE,
Oxfam, and UNDP) distinguishes structural vulnerable households and communities (from those considerd
proximate vulnerable) as those units that exhibit underlying characteristics (e.g. high dependency ratio -number of
economic-active members versus number of children and members older than 65 years) that make them (more)
vulnerable.
infrastructure, among others. Consequently, overcoming vulnerability entails building capacities
in the face of hazards (Cutter 2006).
Different areas of knowledge conceptualize and measure vulnerability attending to different
factors. Two common elements are 1) the need for a level of reference (a benchmark) for any
empirical evaluation, and 2) the relationship between vulnerability and risk. The features of this
relationship define the optimal evaluation method and guide the definition of a metric (Alwang,
Siegel and Jorgensen 2001). Nevertheless, debates and criticism on different approaches reflect
the fact that the quest for a universal indicator of vulnerability is futile since each discipline takes
into account different elements for its conceptualization. Thus, there is no perfect statistic, but
effective combination of indicators toward the understanding of vulnerability in a specific
individual or community. Later on this document, there is an explanation of how this
understanding is a necessary condition for designing and improving risk-transfer mechanisms
and, ultimately, comprehensive regional and national development programs.
1.1.1 Vulnerability and poverty
Some authors have pointed out poverty as an indicator of vulnerability 12 since the poor has fewer
assets to be exercised in case of a disruptive event (Morduch 1999). For instance, in the
economics field, vulnerable are those individuals or groups that have fell and/or are likely to fall
into a state of poverty due to the cumulative effect of shocks. Consequently, vulnerability is
conceptualized as the probability to fall into poverty (at least once in the following years) (Ray
1998, Morduch 1999). Additionally, some sociology authors use vulnerability as a
characterization of non-quantifiable dimensions of poverty (Loughhead and Mittai 2000); often
using social vulnerability as an opposed concept to economic vulnerability. Regarding the scope
12 Adger, 1999; Serra 1999; Putnam, 1993; Sharma, et.al., 2000.
of this research, I argue that vulnerability and poverty are not necessarily related concepts.
Traditional definitions of poverty'" are static and fail to capture the dynamic dimension of
vulnerability (Ray 1998). For instance, medium and medium-high income communities in the
Isle of Honshu, Japan (2008) and in Mexico City (1985) have been vulnerable disasters because
its location in a seismic area14 . On the other hand, a community might be both poor and resilient
if it is self-sufficient in terms of effectively pooling the risk posed by its environment. For
example, a rural community can be less sensible to socioeconomic and political changes and
market-related shocks due to its geographic isolation (GTZ 2005). Furthermore, urban
communities tend to be more fragmented with fewer forms of social capital that households
could use in case of a shock (Loughhead and Mittai 2000). Consequently, I assert that poverty is
not a measure of vulnerability, or vice versa, but some factors affect both concepts.
1.2 Hazard, the disruptive event
Hazards are unexpected or uncontrollable events of unusual magnitude whose general sources
are the nature or the human action. Hazards' frequency, duration and magnitude'5 , in
combination with vulnerability, determine the characteristics of risk. In this document, I refer
indistinctively to hazard as disruptive event or shock. For the present research, I subdivide
hazards in four categories: natural, market, health, and manmade.
13 Generally, income below a certain given threshold.
14 "Past examples of disasters do not necessarily show that higher-income groups with access to information are
less vulnerable and therefore less likely to suffer. In the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, the lower middle-class was
the most affected group as their high-rise housing was more vulnerable to the earthquake's ground motion than
the low adobe and brick-built houses in low-income neighborhoods." (Main and Williams 1994, p. 38 as cited in:
IDB 2000,p.26-27).
is Of contemporary relevance, it is necessary to point out the impact of human activities, such as urbanization, in
the environmental context of a region and, ultimately, in the modification of hazards' characteristics.
1.3 Risk, its elements and forms
Risk is another concept whose definition differs from discipline to discipline and it is frequently
used indistinctively with other terms (e.g. hazard, uncertainty and volatility). For the purposes of
this research, I distinguish between hazard, the actual disruptive event, and risk, which I
conceptualize as a function of social vulnerability and the probability of occurrence of a
particular hazard.
v u ner aollitE
Risk
Figure 1-1 The relationship between risk, vulnerability and hazard
Thus, achieving understanding of risk implies the analysis of the two broad dimensions of
vulnerability (socioeconomic and demographic factors, and environmental context) and their
dynamic process of combination that elevates the impact of a hazard into a disaster. A traditional
classification of risk that illustrates the results of the multidimensional combination of hazard
and vulnerability defines risk as idiosyncratic, with limited impact to a few individuals or
P
..____._...........................
households, or systemic, affecting a large portion of a community or region -see the following
table for examples of each category.
I T peofRisk Impact Deptli Traditional Sourccs (Shock) I
Idiosyncratic
(Individual, independent)
Affecting only one or a
few units (individuals o
households)
 * Illness or death of family
r members
* Unemployment or loss of
income-generating activity by
family members
* Assets loss (to a criminal
act, or accident)
e * Weather and other natural
events
* Market shocks
* Epidemics
Table 1-1 Risks. Classification of their impact
2. The Role of Social Risk Management
2.1 Different facets of social risk management
I use the term Social Risk Management (SRM) to refer to that area of risk management
embedded into the framework of social security aimed to vulnerability reduction and whose
cornerstone is the collective action in a community or region. SRM includes the endeavors from
diverse agents 16 to help individuals and communities better manage risk through access to social
assets, economic opportunities, and risk-response mechanisms (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000).
Individuals and communities respond to risks in several ways, but in general, they have one of
the following three objectives: i) minimize the size of the maximum possible welfare loss
referenced by a socioeconomic threshold. ii) Minimize the probability of a loss in consumption.
iii) Maximize the expected rate of return given a level of income variance (Holzmann and
Jorgensen 2000).
Any strategy of SRM is a reaction prompted by the actual or expected impact in welfare due to
the past or future occurrence of a given hazard and defined by people's vulnerability to that
particular hazard. When the disruptive event has happened, people react to cope with and recover
from its impact; when the event has not occurred (but it is foreseen), people prepare themselves
to prevent or mitigate its damage. People use diverse types of risk management strategies
depending on their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and their accessibility to
these strategies. I classify these strategies considering three dimensions of SRM (see Table 2-1).
In the following sub-sections, I will elaborate on the description of these three dimensions.
16 From NGOs, private institutions, government to multinational organizations and the world community at large.
Formality ot the mechanism Intormal Formal
Ex-ante Ex-post
Focus (area of vulnerability) Human-related factors Environmental factors
Table 2-1 Social risk management. Dimensional classification
2.1.1 What is formal risk management and what are its advantages vis-
A-vis informal strategies?
For the scope of this research, I understand formal risk management strategies as market-based
instruments generally provided, operated or linked to an external agent. The main rationale to
center this research on formal risk management strategies -and the factors that promote the
likelihood of its adoption, it is due to their advantages vis-a-vis informal mechanisms to prevent,
mitigate, cope with or recovery from the impact of systemic hazards such as natural shocks.
Traditionally, informal SRM strategies are inefficient in dealing with this type of hazards (J.
Skees 2004, Hazell and Miranda 1999, Allianz AG, GTZ and UNDP 2006). When risks are
idiosyncratic, family members with similar socioeconomic characteristics and exposure to
hazards can combine incomes and lower their level of risk. This process has low or no impact on
their income. On the other hand, when risks are systemic, the advantage of pooling or combining
incomes disappears (Skees 2004). Furthermore, many types of idiosyncratic and systemic risks
are correlated each other. For example, weather risk affecting crops may lead to price shock in
the markets for commodities. For that matter, traditional informal strategies of risk management
frequently fail to smooth the income of affected individuals and groups. To cope with correlated
risk, income and other resources (e.g. insurance, credit, savings, and technical advice) must come
from outside the community (Stoppa, Andrea and Hess, Ulrich, 2003). There are three elements
that different authors 17 point out as the fundamentals of the advantages of formal over informal
risk management: 1) the sustainability of the strategy, 2) the awareness of risk, and 3) the access
to networks and markets for risk transference.
I use Table 2-2 Traditional relationship between risk and SRMto exemplify how different schemes of
social risk management are applied in response to the future or past occurrence of a disruptive
event. This is only one example of a wide range of possible combinations between SRM and
risk, which are determined by the vulnerability of people and their accessibility to (formal) risk-
response mechanisms. In this traditional combination, people manage individual risks by
informal strategies, such as migration or crop diversification. As the risk depth and level of
damage increase, a household would need the help of relatives or other members of the
community to manage risk up to the point where the support of an external agent is needed. As I
pointed out earlier, the efficiency of informal strategies falls as the covariance of the risk
increase. Generally, the impact of a highly widespread event with catastrophic consequences for
a region and country is prevented, mitigated or overcome only by international support.
17 See for example (Skees, Hazell and Miranda 1999, Kunreuther 1969, UNDP 2004).
Unprotected
A
Idiosyncratic
Risk
A k
Informal SRM
International
disaster relief
and human
assistance
Insurance
Reinsurance
Community risk
pooling
Public
restitution
funds
Self-managed
Table 2-2 Traditional relationship between risk and SRM
Despite their advantages, factors like poor distribution channels, complexity
and higher adoption costs (Skees 2004) cause that formal mechanisms
penetration whilst the use of informal strategies is widespread.
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2.1.2 Temporarily of the mechanism: ex-ante or ex-post risk
management
Ex-ante strategies are implemented prior to the hazard's occurrence to prevent, mitigate, cope
with and/or recover from its impact. These strategies entail empiric knowledge of a given
hazard's future occurrence. Before the event happens, people seek to improve their capabilities
to face its negative effects, reduce them, or definitely avoid them. This anticipation foregoes
assets (e.g. labour, income) in exchange for future benefit to diminish the impact of the hazard.
Examples of ex-ante strategies include the accumulation of buffer stocks as precautionary
savings and the diversification of income-generating activities through changing labor allocation
ISystemic Risk
r
Formal SRM National
I Ir Irr
(working in farm and non-farm small businesses, and seasonal migration) or varying cropping
practices (planting different crops, like drought-resistant produce, planting in different fields and
staggered over time, intercropping, and relying on low risk inputs). On the other hand, ex-post
SRM aims at coping with and recovery since these strategies are implemented after the shock has
occurred'8. Examples of ex-post strategies include seeking an additional employment, selling
livestock, household appliances or other assets, withdrawing children from school, and
borrowing from family, or neighbors. Additionally, disaster relief funds and post-disaster
recovery support are examples of ex-post strategies.
2.1.3 Focus of the mechanism: human-related factors, environmental
factors
Additionally to the dimensions identified above, which are normally cited in the risk
management literature, I propose another dimension of SRM: focus of the mechanism. This is
based on the intelligence that each risk-response mechanism aim to overcome either one of the
two areas of vulnerability described in Chapter 1: socioeconomic and demographic, or
environmental. The construction of an irrigation system focuses on overcoming the vulnerability
generated by the natural environment and the geographical location of a community. Likewise,
reducing economic vulnerability is the motivation of a business creation program.
Any risk-response solution is a combination of three dimensions of social risk management.
Table 2-3 illustrates the dimensional combination of some SRM strategies.
18 However, a continuously implemented ex-post strategy can become a preventive measure - an ex-ante
mechanism.
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2.1.4 Supply-side factors hampering the grow of the formal risk
management market
Why the use of formal SRM is not widespread? This research attempts to provide relevant
information to answer this question from the point of view of the demand by identifying some of
the socioeconomic, demographic and environmental factors that increase the likelihood of
adoption of formal mechanisms. However, there are a series of issues affecting the supply that
represent challenges for the growth of this market:
* Making the risk insurable and creating a sellable product. Vaughan (1989) points out
some of the premises for achieving a risk insurable: a) a series of homogeneous and
independent units exposed to risks can be grouped, b) the likelihood of occurrence of a
disruptive event is quantifiable and the loss function can be calculated with an acceptable
level of confidence, c) the damage is correlated with the risk, and neither of both are
caused by the affected of policy holder, and d) the insurance price or premium is
affordable by the demand. This challenge comprises product design, price discovery and
selection of distribution channels suitable for the characteristics of vulnerable
communities, along with an educative endeavor for the end-users and the channels of
distribution (Allianz AG, GTZ and UNDP 2006, Barnett, Barrett and Skees 2006).
* Lack of historic and reliable data hampers the calculation of thresholds for natural events.
Although there is not a consensus on the extent of time series to construct reliable natural
parameters for a given region, some experts 19 claim that at least 30 year of daily
information is a pre-condition. Generally, developing countries have issues on
19 See for example (Ulrich, Kaspar and Stoppa 2003)
availability and maintenance of weather stations throughout the territory. Moral hazard
issues associated with data collection are accentuated in developing nations with unsound
institutional frameworks (Smith 2006). Despite the fact that some of them are recognized
for providing long series of adequate weather data (e.g. Argentina, Chile, Mexico,
Morocco, Nicaragua, South Africa, Tunisia) (J. Skees 2004), many of their isolated (and
more vulnerable) communities continue to be distant from infrastructure for weather data
collection (World Bank 2006). Additionally, partly caused by the lack of reliable data, the
likelihood of basis risk is significant for newer instruments (Hazell and Miranda 1999).
* Current regulations in many countries are prohibitive for market-based SRM
development. For instance, financial intermediaries transacting derivatives are usually not
allowed to engage in reinsuring in developing economies (Ulrich, Kaspar and Stoppa
2003). Similarly, the process for obtaining license for derivatives operation limits the
market to large institutions (banks).
* Effect of government intervention on the development of a private SRM market.
Historically, some sector economic activities, such as agriculture, have been highly
subsidized by governments around the world as a measure to overcome vulnerability20
On the other hand, in many countries, some types of insurance, such as health, have
become a form of social welfare due to the mandate of laws and regulations including
social policy programs 21 . In spite of the value of these strategies for reducing
vulnerability, they cause market distortions affecting the entrance and establishment of
20 This support has ranged from different ex-post transferences (assets and income) to ex-ante policies and
programs (e.g. market interventions like price control and import taxes), and it has included the provision of crop
and livestock insurance (Barnett, Barrett and Skees 2006).
21 Often, state regulation forces insurance companies to cover certain (marginalized) groups at low or no premium
or more risks with the consequent impact on premiums (Hoppe 2006). In India, for example, the Insurance
Regulatory and Development Authority requires insurers to provide coverage to rural and social sectors (Sinha
n.d.).
private suppliers. For example, government insurance crowds out private sector SRM
since based on price competence, and ceteris paribus, an individual would prefer a free or
low cost policy vis-a'-vis the product provided by a private microinsurer.
3. Research Design and Preliminary
Analyses
After the conceptualization and literature review on risk -which is comprised by vulnerability
and hazards- in Chapter One, Chapter Two entailed a description of formal social risk
management (SRM) and an explanation of its advantages over informal risk-response
mechanisms to manage risk, and especially systemic risk. In this Chapter, I describe the
methodology applied to achieve the research goal whose main motivation is the limited use of
formal SRM in the developing world.
3.1 The research at a glance
My research aims at identifying the main factors (i.e. socioeconomic characteristics,
organizational structures, household idiosyncrasies and environmental circumstances) that
increase the likelihood of adoption of formal social risk management by households in India and
Mexico. Toward the achievement of this objective, I carried out a quasi-experimental research 22
based on nominal and ordinal household data collected through statistical surveys conducted in
the district of Kalahandi, state of Orissa, India, and in the municipalities of Ahome, state of
Sinaloa, Valle de Santiago, state of Guanajuato, and Villa Flores, state of Chiapas, Mexico.
Focus groups and key informant interviews were also conducted during the research, which have
the support of two sponsoring organizations: the Center for Insurance and Risk Management, in
India, and Agroasemex, in Mexico.
22 The research does not incorporate two of the elements of an experimental research: exposure to a stimulus and
repeated measurement.
The household-level data collection was undertaken primarily to identify two areas of the
households:
i. The Risk Profile. Identify the main sources of risk attending its two dimensions:
a. The underlying factors of vulnerability comprised by the households'
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and their natural and built
environmental context.
b. The diverse types of natural and manmade hazards confronting the households.
ii. The Social Risk Management Profile. Describe the risk-response mechanisms adopted
by the households.
I analyze the data through statistical methods to assess the association between the risk profile
and the SRM profile. The assessment is centered on the analysis of two factors that some
authors23 have pointed out as relevant for the adoption of formal SRM: level of household's
association (i.e. affiliation to community-based groups) and access to infrastructure (i.e.
proximity to roads, urban-mixed use areas and financial services).
3.1.1 The surveys' instrument
Although the model of questionnaire was slightly modified from one country to another to
capture the differences in context24, a two-module framework was the backbone of the
questionnaires:
23 See for example (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000) (Policy Integration and Analysis Branch 2007) (Osbahr and Few
2006) (Saegert, Thompson and Warren 2002).
24 Beyond the expected adaptation to the Mexican context, the experience on India contributed to identify some of
the areas of the questionnaire that should be modified toward the achievement of the research goals.
Consequently, the questionnaire applied in Mexico had two main differences regarding the research instrument
i. The first module assesses the demographic and socio-economic profile of the household.
In that sense, it captures distributions by social groups, occupational categories, land
distribution and returns on size class holdings. It also elicits income and expenditure
and assets such as land holdings, ownership of house and durable assets, livestock,
modes of transport, financial assets and indebtedness.
ii. The second module elicits the information required to build the households' risk profile
in terms of hazards exposure and risk management strategies. The questions are
addressed to capture information on disruptive events experienced by households in
the district and their frequency in different periods. Pre-coded questions were used to
identify weather-environmental, economic, personal and social/political shocks, and
whether they are idiosyncratic or systemic. Finally, households were asked for the
strategies used (formal and informal) ex-ante or ex-post the occurrence of the
disruptive event.
3.1.2 Data organization and assumptions regarding the research
question
3.1.2.1 The dependent variable -Adoption of SRM
As stated in Chapter 2, I define formality in social risk management as any market-based
mechanism aimed to prevent, mitigate, recover or cope with the effects of a disruptive event. In
this sense, I distinguish endogeneity in the adoption of the mechanism. As a rule for data
classification, the formal SRM strategies that I consider in the model for assessing the research
used in India: 1) it entails more description of the group to which the household is affiliated; and 2) it includes a
section for distance to infrastructure and characteristics of public services provision.
question are only those mechanisms that have been acquired and implemented by the
households' voluntary decision. Thus,
1. I am not taking into account free-provided insurance, but only those policies voluntary
bought by the household.
2. Improvements in house construction and community infrastructure are considered in the
analysis only if they are initiatives proposed by the household.
The responses of the SRM strategies in the second module of the survey are distributed into three
groups25:
1. Households with at least one type of formal SRM.
2. Households with at least one type of informal SRM and no formal mechanism.
3. Households applying no strategy before or after the event.
For the tests of association, the dependent variable -adoption of (formal) SRM- is treated as a
binary variable where 1: formal SRM, 0: informal SRM. The observations of households that
reported not applying any strategy are not considered in the probit regressions. The following
table shows the classification into informal (I) and formal (F) of the SRM strategies listed in the
questionnaire.
25 Code 6.3 and 6.4 of the questionnaire. See annexes for more reference.
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Table 3-1Classification of the questionnaire's SRM strategies by formality
3.1.2.2 Key notes on some of the explanatory variables
Almost every variable measured through the surveys was tested with measures of goodness of
fit. In the present document, I include the regressions' results with the variables level of
association and access to infrastructure. The following is a description of some of the analyzed
variables pertinent to the analysis of each sample's descriptive statistics:
Income level3.1.2.2.1
unity
AI ast  ietc
For the study in Mexico, the questionnaire classifies the household's average monthly income in
Mexican Pesos 26 in four ranges 27 defined in accordance to the income threshold that the
CONAPO uses to evaluate income poverty -two minimum wages 28 per day (CONAPO 2006).
Likewise, the income ranges29 for the questionnaire applied in India attend the reference of the
Poverty Line -one USD per day, established by the Government of India (Directorate of Census
2002). In this case, the ranges are in Indian Rupees3o
3.1.2.2.2 Level of Association
The questionnaire has a section for the description of household's affiliations with community-
based groups: type of group, time that the household has (had) been affiliated, and services or
other benefits obtained by associating. Thus, level of association is a categorical variable taking
value when one member of the household is affiliated to local groups -i.e., 0: No associated, 1:
Associated to economic group, 2: Associated to social group, 3: Associated to both types of
group. For ordering the tests of association, I defined binary observations per household -0:
household no associated, 1: household associated.
3.1.2.2.3 Access to Infrastructure
I built an indicator comprised by the distance from the household to a) main (regional) road b)
urban mixed-use areas (markets), and c) financial services. The variable is in meters and the
26 The currency exchange value of the Mexican Peso (MXP) at August 15, 2008 is 10.1966 per 1 United States Dollar
(USD) (IMF 2008).
27 Less than 3,000 MXP, between 3,000 MXP and 6,000 MXP, between 6,000 MXP and 10,000 MXP, and more than
10,000 MXP.
28 The minimum wage in Mexico is defined regionally: in 2008, for region A is 52.59 Mexican Pesos (MXN) -Ahome,
for region B is 50.96 -Valle de Santiago, and for region C is 49.50 -Villaflores (SAT 2008).
29 Less than 500 Rs, between 501 Rs and 1000 Rs, between 1001 Rs and 5000 Rs, and more than 5000 Rs.
30 The currency exchange value of the Indian Rupee (Rp) at August 15, 2008 is 42.80 per 1 United States Dollar
(USD) (IMF 2008).
distances 31 are based on parameters of social equity defined by the United Nations and the
Ministry of Social Development in Mexico (PNUD 2007, CONAPO 2003).
3.1.2.2.4 Education Level
It refers to the average educational attainment of the members of the household. The variable is
ordinal with seven classifications ranging from "Illiterate" to "College or Higher Degree" and
was defined following triggers pointed out by the United Nations (UNDP 2006) and the Asian
Development Bank (The Asian Development Bank 2008).
3.2 Study in India- Description
Figure 3-1 India study- Geographic location of the district
31 Less than one kilometer (Km), between one Km an five Kms, between five Kms and 20 Kms, and more than 20Kms.
The survey in India was carried out between June and August 2007 with the Center for Insurance
and Risk Management (CIRM)32. The CIRM was responsible for selecting the research team, the
location, the partner organizations and setting up the logistical and financial resources to
complete the study. In the first phase, the CIRM decided to partner with Parivartan33 and Harsha
Trust 34, NGOs with experience in the region in managing microfinance self-help groups and
implementing other development projects on education and agriculture.
3.2.1 Methodology
3.2.1.1 Data collection
3.2.1.1.1 Exploratory analysis
3.2.1.1.1.1 Selection criteria of the research communities
The problem posed by the monsoon season that accentuated the isolation of many villages in the
scattered Kalahandi's geography made accessibility a challenge for conducting the survey. This
factor led to base the study on two sample blocks: Golamunda block35, which portrays an
average socio economic picture of rural Kalahandi and Bhawanipatna (District Headquarter),
representative of the urban, semi-urban mix of the population.
32 Housed in the Institute for Financial Management and Research (IFMR) -Chennai, India, the Centre for Insurance
and Risk Management (CIRM) has been setup as a sectoral infrastructure to focus on developing product
development capabilities for insurance and other risk mitigating instruments..
33 Parivartan is a development organization that has been working in Kalahandi since 1990. It worked in
partnership with CARE through the CASHE project as well. Among the initiatives of Parivartan there are natural
resources programs mainly related to irrigation, food security programs in partnership with World Bank, education
provision and promotion of microfinance institutions (MFIs) and of co-operatives (Flores Ballesteros, Gaurav and
Gomez 2007).
Harsha trust focuses on livelihood promotion activities in marginalized communities, predominantly tribal.
Harsha Trust has been working in drought affected areas in Golamunda Block with development projects for
agriculture based livelihoods in 16 villages. One of the main programs is focused on developing village managed
irrigation technologies and training farmers for commercially viable agriculture (Flores Ballesteros, Gaurav and
Gomez 2007).
35 Administratively, India is divided in states and union territories, they are comprised by districts. The districts'
subdivisions in the rural area are the blocks, and every block has a series of villages. In urban areas, the
administrative division is based on Urban Local Bodies.
3.2.1.1.2 The survey
3.2.1.1.2.1 Sample method
The methodology to obtain the sampled households comprised of the following two phases:
1. Survey on Golamunda block
a. With the help of the partner association, we selected from the block list those villages that
were within a 30-kilometer radius from Harsha Trust's headquarters. It meant a sample of
24 villages out of the 176 comprising the block.
b. The unit of analysis was the household with a total population of 27,309 households in the
entire block of Golamunda, and 5,404 in the 24 villages comprising the sample. The process
to obtain the units to be surveyed was the following:
i. With an error of five percent and 95 percent of confidence, the calculated sample size
was of 379 households. Additionally, estimating a response rate around 60 percent, we
adjusted the target at 600 households.
ii. The number of units per village was obtained through a weighted average based on
total number of households. Using the census list, a simple random sampling was
performed to select the households to be surveyed.
iii. With an actual response of 80 percent, we ended up with 480 questionnaires to be
analyzed.
2. Survey on Bhawanipatna village
a. We defined a target of 50 questionnaires to be obtained through Parivartan.
b. The households were selected with a simple random sampling out of the census list.
(inhabited dwellings3 7 ) Golamunda Bhawanipatna
)72309 12 275
2,415
25
Golamunda
480
[1.69%]
Bhawanipatna
50
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4.34%
[5.72%]
Table 3-2. India Study -Survey coverage (Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner 2002)
3.2.1.2 Data analysis
I used a probit model of the form:
36 Figures of Bhawanipatna refer to the town (not to the block).
37 Used for housing.
38 Based on the average number of inhabitants per household.
39 Calculated with the sum of total and surveyed hhs in Golamunda and Bhawanipatna.
Pr(Y1 = 1 X1, X2) = 4(o + P1 sA)
Where:
Y1 is the adoption of social risk management
(i.e. Y, = 1, the household adopted formal strategy to manage risk)
Kalahandi, Orissa
27309 12275
Equation 3-1 India Study- Regression model
3.2.2 The district. Kalahandi, Orissa
Table 3-3. India Study- Socioeconomic and demographic overview (Directorate of Census 2002)
Ilule 3-4. Imnal 3Euay- vulneraolity ana margination overview (Directorate ot Census 2002)
[4) = the cumulative standard normal distribution function]
S1= factor 1 (e.g. level of association)
Note.
S1 is a dummy variable - [1= household associated, 0= household no
associated]
3.3 Study in Mexico -Description
Figure 3-2. Mexico study -Geographic location of the municipalities
The exploratory analyses and the surveys were carried out between April and August 2008. The
surveys in three municipalities of Mexico were conducted with the support of Agroasemex.
3.3.1 Agroasemex
Majoritarily owned and run by the Mexican federal government, Agroasemex started up in 1991
as a public policy instrument for the comprehensive protection of the rural sector. Agroasemex
has two main explicit roles: 1) as an insurer, the institution provides reinsurance services to
insurance institutions, mutual societies and insurance funds, and 2) as a development agency, it
promotes the participation of private, civil and multinational organizations in the market of
farming insurance through the design of new insurance schemes. Agroasemex is internationally
recognized as the institution that transacted the first weather derivative contract in the developing
world (Environmental Finance 2002).
3.3.1.1 Fondos. Mutual Insurance Funds
The surveys implementation was linked with the availability in the municipality of mutual
insurance funds -Fondos de Aseguramiento 40 , commonly known as Fondos, which are the
backbone of Agroasemex's reinsurance provision.
3.3.2 Methodology
3.3.2.1 Data collection
3.3.2.1.1 Exploratory analysis
3.3.2.1.1.1 Selection criteria of the research communities
By selecting municipalities situated in the north, center and south of Mexico, I intended to
capture into the study a diversity of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and
environmental contexts, along with exposure to different types of hazards. The sites selection
was centered on the list of the Fondos -the mutual insurance funds, with the goal of taking
advantage of the funds' infrastructure during the implementation of the survey. Hence, the three
40 The Fondos are agriculture associations, legally constituted as civil associations, promoted by the Ministry of
Agriculture, approved by the Ministry of Finance (Secretaria de Hacienda) and run by farmers aimed to manage
federal subsidies (FAPRACC, see 3.1.2.1.2) for the provision of insurance for agriculture and livestock producers.
They started formally in 1988 with farmers from Sonora. In 2008, there are 304 Fondos authorized by the Ministry
of Finance and 272 have operated reinsurance with Agroasemex in the last two years (Agroasemex 2008). Under
this scheme, agriculture insurance in Mexico has risen from 636,000 hectares in 1991 to more than 2 million in mid
2000s, and livestock insurance from 576,000 heads to more than 10 million in the same period. The Fondo's
insurance can cover not only weather and agriculture-related risks (e.g. drought, excess moisture, hail, frost, fire,
wind, plagues, and livestock diseases) but also health idiosyncratic risks (e.g. illness and deaths) (Wenner and Arias
2003). Based on my exploratory analysis, I concluded that the Fondos tend to be located in areas with low and
medium marginality. This situation differs from some authors' assertion that these associations are mainly found in
low-income areas of Mexico.
selected municipalities have at least one insurance association -i.e. there was a probability that
households that have adopted some fashion of formal social risk management were randomly
selected. The following was the process for selecting the surveyed municipalities:
i. The country map was divided in three regions: north, center and south.
ii. The parameters for the socioeconomic classification and subsequent selection of the
communities were the Social Development Index (indice de Desarrollo Social -SD141 ) and
the Margination Index (Indice de Marginaci6n- MI42) calculated by the National Population
Council. The main reason for the use of these parameters was the variables comprising
them, which allow a spatial characterization of vulnerability. The classification of the
research municipalities according to the MI's nine facets and the SDI can be analyzed in
Table 3-7. Mexico Study- Vulnerability and margination overview (CONAPO 2006) and Table
3-8. Mexico Study -Social Development, respectively.
iii. Agroasemex selected 30 potential funds/municipalities from the list of 304 Fondos. The
basic condition was to have a combination of a) levels of MI and SDI, b) exposure to natural
41 The Social Development Index (indice de Desarrollo Social -IDS) is a quantitative and qualitative evaluation
calculated by CONAPO with the goal of obtaining a reference that could guide policy making in the area of social
development through the spatial identification of areas with higher concentration of vulnerability. The first version
of the IDS is based on 2000 Census data and is comprised by five analytic dimensions (CONAPO 2003):
1. Capacity to enjoy a healthy life.
2. Capacity to get knowledge to perform actively in society.
3. Capacity to enjoy adequate conditions to study and develop oneself.
4. Capacity to participate in the economic activity and have the benefit of adequate conditions of labour
inclusion.
5. Capacity to reside in a good quality dwelling and earn an income enough to afford a decent standard of
living.
IDS methodology of calculation can be found in the Annexes Section.
42 The Margination Index is a measurement that classifies states, municipalities and other federal entities regarding
the impacts that lack of access to education, adequate housing and income generating sources along with those
associated with living in small communities have on their population. The MI entails four structural dimensions of
margination, identifies nine forms of exclusion, and measures its spatial intensity as the percentage of the
population that does not have the benefit of goods and services needed for "the development of basic
capabilities". It identifies five levels of
margination: very high, high, medium, low, and very low (CONAPO 2006).
hazards, and c) communities from the three regions of the country. There are some
clarifications pertinent to this phase:
1. There is an unequal distribution of number of funds throughout the country. The majority
of them are localized in northern states.
2. As stated earlier, the funds are generally located in municipalities with lower level of
margination. However, more developed municipalities from the list of funds tend to be
grouped in the north; medium MI municipalities, in the center; and low MI
municipalities, in the south. Furthermore, none of the funds from the north is located in
municipalities with high MI -or low SDI.
3. Therefore, the list of 30 funds was not an equally weighted combination of margination
levels and distribution spatial.
iv. I made the final selection based on a secondary data evaluation of every municipality
regarding its a) socioeconomic and demographic standards, b) hazard exposure, and c)
accessibility and other logistical factors.
3.3.2.1.2 The surveys
3.3.2.1.2.1 Sample method
This was the process for obtaining the sampled households in the three municipalities:
1. A target of 2000 sampled households 43 per municipality was set.
2. Using the list of households per locality -localidad4 (INEGI 2006), I eliminated
places with fewer than 20 inhabited dwellings.
The targeted sample size was defined based on the research budget.
In Mexico, the federation is divided into states (and a federal district), which are divided into municipalities(municipios) comprised, at the same time, by localities.
3. I made a distribution of the sample size in the remainder localities by using weighted
averages based on the adjusted number of households -total population of households
in the municipality minus households in localities with fewer than 20 inhabited
dwellings.
4. Using the census list (INEGI 2001) by locality, I performed a simple random
sampling. See Table 3-5. Mexico study -Survey coverage for a synopsis of the survey
coverage.
182 186 204
97,348
7,979
128
96,788
2,000
[2.07%]
- at confidence level of 95 % [99%]
1701 % R2 85%
45 Used for housing.
46 Based on the average number of inhabitants per household.
47 The rainy season in Mexico, which was fueled by the impact of diverse storms and a hurricane, affected a large
portion of the south of Mexico and some areas of the center and north of the country. Many areas were affected
by floods including communities surrounding Villaflores. This situation hampered the work of the surveyors and,
due to the time constraint, led me to finalize the survey at the final number of 1700 surveyed households.
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Table 3-5. Mexico study -Survey coverage (INEGI 2006)
3.3.2.2 Data analysis
To assess the existence of relationships between the adoption of (formal) SRM strategies and
diverse characteristics of households and the community, and in accordance to the process of
transforming the dependent variable into a binary variable as explained in 3.1.2.1, I ordered
probit 48 regressions of the form:
Equation 3-2. Mexico Study -Regression model
48 The Probit regression is a nonlinear model specifically designed for binary dependent variables. This model uses
the cumulative normal distribution function to model the probability of an event given one or more independent
variables.
Pr(Yj = 1IX1, X2) = C(I3o+ 31 s51+ 32 S2 )
Where:
YV is the adoption of social risk management
(i.e. Y, = 1, the household adopted formal strategy to manage risk)
[) = the cumulative standard normal distribution function]
S1= factor 1 (e.g. level of association)
S2= factor 2 (e.g. infrastructure proximity)
Note.
S is a dummy variable - [1= household associated, 0= household no
associated]
S2 is an ordinal variable [1, 2,3,4] (where 1= closer, 4=farther)
3.3.3 The municipalities. Ahome, Sinaloa; Valle de Santiago,
Guanajuato; and Villaflores, Chiapas
In this section, I present a series of parameters that capture some of the areas of vulnerability, as
conceptualized in Chapter 1, with the objective of contextualizing the study and illustrating some
of the main arguments that led to the selection of this places. In this sense, Table 3-6. Mexico
Study- Socioeconomic and demographic overview (INEGI 2006)presents a general socioeconomic
and demographic description of the areas of study; whilst Table 3-7. Mexico Study- Vulnerability
and margination overview (CONAPO 2006) has a vulnerability evaluation of the municipalities
according to the Margination Index. Finally, a comparison of the three municipalities' with the
state and national standards attending their level of social development by gender is shown in
Table 3-8. Mexico Study -Social Development.
I ale o-b. Mexico stuay- soctoeconomic and demographic overview (INEGI 2006)
Valle de Villaflores,Ahome, Sinaloa Santiago, ChiapasGuanajuato
Table 3-7. Mexico Study- Vulnerability and margination overview (CONAPO 2006)
Note: Figures in the areas of MI are presented as percentage of the total population
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) classifies Ahome in the 5 5th position in 2005
(8 8 th in 2000) out of 2,243 federal entities (states municipalities and the Federal District
delegations) according to the Human Development Index (HDI). Ahome has a HDI of 0.8778
that corresponds to a high level of human development (PNUD 2008). CONAPO situates it on
the seventeenth position within the state in terms of margination. According to the UNDP, Valle
de Santiago experienced a deterioration of its standards of living (based on the HDI) between
2000 and 2005. The municipality fell from the place 7 80 th in 2000 to the 939th in 2005 -a
medium level of human development (PNUD 2008). Based on the same criterion, Villaflores
improved its level of human development between 2000 and 2005. The municipality was situated
in the position 1 14 0 th in 2000 ascending to the 961st in 2005 (PNUD 2008).
49 The minimum wage in Mexico is defined regionally: in 2008, for region A is 52.59 Mexican Pesos (MXN) -Ahome,for region B is 50.96 -Valle de Santiago, and for region C is 49.50 -Villaflores (SAT 2008).
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Total Men Women Total Men
Mexico 0.687 0.684 0.692 High Medium Medium
Mexico 0.687 0.68
Chiapas 0.526 0.525 0.529 Low Low Low
Villaflores 0.594 0.596 0.590 Low Low Low
Guanajuato 0.675 0.673 0.679 Medium Medium Medium
V. Santiago 0.635 0.634 0.638 Medium Medium Medium
Sinaloa 0.711 0.704 0.722 Medium Medium Medium
ATabome 0.754 0.749 0.763 High Medium High
Table 3-8. Mexico Study -Social Development (CONAPO 2003)
WoTotal Men
men
32 32 32
1082 1053 1138
20 21 20
848 842 857
13 13 12
116 133 101
Women
4. Summary of Findings and Analysis
4.1 Study in India
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics50
4.1.1.1 Socioeconomic and demographic profile
Table 4-1 Kalahandi (Bhawanipatna y Golamunda samples). Descriptive statistics
so Further description of the survey findings can be found in the Annexes.
4.1.1.2 Shocks and SRM profile
4.1.1.2.1 Shocks
Weather was the most recurrent type of disruptive event with around 90 percent of the sampled
households reporting having faced adverse consequences associated to these shocks,
predominantly droughts. Health shocks turned out to be the second most frequent disruptive
event with around 64.5 percent of the sample.
4.1.1.2.2 SRM profile
Kalahandi From the 530 sampled
AdoptionofSRM hbniiCh.rkrle xr 1 A nprr-pnt
houehld ove 14 ercent ~~1
have received free
governmental or
nongovernmental SRM.
Regarding the remaining 453
households, above 4.6 percent
nt lnnlu
UUWPTVIUIIIUb 433 l, ,,VL U1p,,I
0.88%
Formal have had some type of formal
4.64%
Figure 4-1 Kalahandi. Distribution of sample by type of SRM
SRM, 0.88 percent reported not having applied any type of strategy and 94.48 percent of the
sample opted into the use of informal mechanisms (with no use of formal strategies). Children or
other members of the family joining the labour market is the most recurrent informal strategy
with over 87 percent of the sampled households applying informal strategies. The second most
r\l
frequent informal strategy is the use of precautory savings with 9.16 percent. Around 1.50
percent has migrated to urban areas like Mumbai.
From the formal
schemes, crop insurance
is the most popular with
about 42 percent of the
sampled households
using it. About 25
percent of the sample
have bought health
insurance.
Figure 4-2 Kalahandi. Distribution of sample per strategy
The construction of infrastructure with the help of external agents, mainly irrigation systems, has
been opted by 16.44 percent of the surveyed households, and around 12 percent has acquired life
insurance, and cattle insurance remained low at 2.57 percent.
4.1.2 Test of association
Over 31 percent of the sampled households have at least one member of the family affiliated to a
local group or organization. After a basic analysis of the graphs, the data supports my a priori
expectation regarding a relationship between level of association and adoption of (formal) risk
management. In this sense:
* Around 95 percent of the households with formal SRM are associated with a local group.
It means that around 14 percent of the sample with some type of affiliation to an
economic or social group has at least one type of formal SRM, which means 13.76
percentage points more than the not affiliated households' figure.
* Over 99 percent of the sampled households with no association have reacted to shocks by
migrating, reducing consumption, increasing labour market participation by household
members, selling livestock or other form of informal risk coping strategy.
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Table 4-2 Distribution of the sample per level of organization and RMS adoption
I used a bivariate probit model with adoption offormal SRM and level of association.
al i Do Nothing
00%= 311)
51530 HHs (Golamunda plus Bhawanipatna samples) minus 77 (HHs with free SRM) minus 4 (HHs with no strategy).
HH
with
some
type of
memb
ership
[
I Pseudo- R-squared 1 .2401" I
Table 4-3 Kalahandi. Regression results(The standard deviations are given in parentheses under the coefficients)
All the individual coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent level.
The data assessment suggests that association to local groups acts as an incentive for households
to engage in formal social risk management55. The discrete change of the variable level of
association from 0 to 1 is estimated to increase the likelihood of adoption of formal social risk
management in 13.75 percentage points -this effect has a standard error of .02937.
For example, all else equal, a household with no history of association will increase its
probability of acquiring formal risk-response mechanisms from .325 percent to 14.084 percent.
4.2 Study in Mexico
4.2.1 Descriptive statistics
52 There is a correlation of .3047 between the adoption of formal SRM and level of association.
s3 Based on the Chi-square test with two degrees of freedom and a level of significance of .01, the X 2critical is9.21, versus an observed value of 40.73. Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis that the Chi-square test entails andinfer that, at 99 percent of confidence, a relationship does exist between level of organization and adoption of risk
management strategies.
54 The bivariate model explains 24.01 percent of the variance of formal SRM adoption.
The results indicate that the coefficient for formal SRM adoption (1= formal SRM, O= informal SRM) is negativeand significant whilst the coefficient for level of association dummy variable is positive and significant.
This section presents some selected statistics from the surveys conducted in Mexico. Further
description of the socioeconomic and demographic profile of each municipality is available in
the Annexes.
The 5,700 sampled
households in the three
municipalities reported
a total of 96,793
observations of shocks.
From them, weather
emerged as the most
recurrent type of shock
with 39.37 percent of
the observations.
Figure 4-3 Mexico Study- Exposure to shocks
With 30.14 percent, market-related events were the second most important source of
negative impacts for the three samples, and health and man-made shocks occupied the third
and fourth positions with 19.46 percent and 11.03 percent, respectively. The descriptive
statistics exhibited two trends that emerged as the potential relationships that I defined as
the assessments' cornerstone: a) the proportion of households with voluntarily acquired
formal SRM and at least one member affiliated to a local group, and b) the proportion of
households with formal SRM located in a distance of one kilometer or less to infrastructure.
%of houehols
Figure 4-4 Mexico Study. Samples' proximity to economic infrastructure
In line with the
secondary data analysis,
Valle de Santiago and
Villaflores' populations
are highly scattered
regarding their access to
infrastructure.
For example, 15.33 percent and 9.37 percent of the surveyed households in Villaflores and Valle
de Santiago, respectively, are located in a distance of 20 or more kilometers to any type of
economic infrastructure 56. In contrast, almost 65 percent of the surveyed households in Ahome
are situated in a good proximity (one kilometer or less) from infrastructure.
Figure 4-5 Mexico Study. Samples distribution per household's association
Regarding the level of
association, 32.50 percent of the
surveyed households in Ahome
have at least one of their
members affiliated to a local
group. This figure is 9.04 percent
in Valle de Santiago and 13.94
percent in Villaflores.
O6 ut of the 184 localities of Valle de Santiago, only one surpasses 2,000 inhabitants and four the 1,500inhabitants. In the case of Villaflores, there are 203 localities for around 93,000 inhabitants, as a reference, Ahomehas 23 less for its more than 388,000 inhabitants.
Figure 4-6 Mexico Study. Households with formal SRM -Level of association
Findings from the survey
suggest that households with
formal SRM tend to reside in
closer proximity to economic
infrastructure. For instance, in
Ahome, almost 99 percent of
those units live in distances of.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
five kilometers or less. %ofhouseholdswithformalSRM
Figure 4-7 Mexico Study. Households with formal SRM -Proximity to
infrastructure
In Valle de Santiago, this figure is 88.57 percent whilst in Ahome the percentage is over 95
percent. In the latter, no sampled household with formal SRM is located farther than 20
kilometers from roads, financial services and markets. The following sections present
information obtained from the surveys for each municipality.
In Ahome, over half of the
sample households that have
acquired formal SRM have at
least one member affiliated to a
local group. This proportion is
higher in Valle de Santiago and
Villaflores, 85.71 percent and
91.67 percent, respectively.
4.2.1.1 Ahome, Sinaloa
4.2.1.1.1 Socioeconomic and demographic profile
Table 4-4 Ahome. Descriptive statistics
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Figure 4-8 Ahorne. Distribution of observations per shock
droughts with 29.85 percent. Market shock was the second most frequent type with 25.59
percent. In this category, drastic fluctuations of prices emerged as the mode with 31.23 percent.
Health shocks had almost 20 percent of the total observations with chronic diseases being the
mode (37.74 percent). Regarding disruptive events caused directly by humans, Ahome has the
largest percentage of the three municipalities with 14.56 percent. Criminal acts were largely
reported by the sample with 51.34 percent of the manmade shocks' observations.
4.2.1.1.2.2 Social risk management profile
4.2.1.1.2 Shocks and SRM profile
4.2.1.1.2.1 Shocks
With almost forty percent,
weather-related events
were the most recurrent
type of shock from the
38,299 total observations
reported by the 2,000
surveyed households.
From them, the mode was
strong wings (or
hurricanes, cyclone or
tornados) with 34.16
f ll, I
Ahome
Adoption of SRM per Type
Observations= 1,857
With 7.27 percent,
Ahome presented the
highest percentage of
sampled households
that voluntary adopted
formal SRM of the
three municipalities.
The mode of the formal
Figure 4-9 Ahome. Sample distribution per SRM strategy
strategies in Ahome is the insurance with 45.67 percent of the observations of this category. On
the other hand, households applying an informal strategy account for almost 90 percent of the
sample. Diversification of the production or obtaining a new job was the most observed informal
strategy with 28.45 percent. About 2.8 percent of the households reported not applying any
strategy. From the 2,000 surveyed households, 143 (7.15 percent) have received free SRM,
especially subsidized agricultural insurance policies57
57 Note that the observations of those households that received premium-subsidized insurance or other fashion offree formal risk-response strategy not obtained through the voluntary decision of the family or one member of thefamily are not taking into account in these statistics. The rationale of this process is explained in Chapter four.
7.27%
4.2.1.2 Valle de Santiago, Guanajuato
4.2.1.2.1 Socioeconomic and demographic profile
Variable Defnition Mean Stadr i a
Devitio
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4.2.1.2.2 Hazards and SRM profile
4.2.1.2.2.1 Shocks
The market is the main
source of disruptive
events according to the
survey. It had 42.07
percent of the total
36,038 observations
reported by the sampled
households. The mode
of the market shocks
was the increase of
inputs costs -41 percent.
Figure 4-10 Valle de Santiago. Distribution of observations per shock
Weather was the second source with 34.10 percent. In this case, strong wings were the mode
with 36.04 percent followed by frost and hailstorm with 29.67 percent. About 19 percent of the
observations corresponded to health issues. Chronic diseases were the most frequent in this area
with 38.10 percent of the health-related observations. Finally, manmade hazards had one out of
every twenty observations. Intoxication or poisoning is the most representative problem of this
category.
4.2.1.2.2.2 Social risk management profile
Valle de Santiago
Adoption of SRM per Type
Observations= 1,799 Formal
1.95%
Figure 4-11 Valle de Santiago. Sample distribution per SRM st
10.05 percent of
the 2 000 samnled
... . 7. . . . .. r -- v
households in
Valle de Santiago
have received
some form of free
SRM -mainly
ot apply
0.78% from public
assistance
:rategy
;rams.
Regarding the rest of the sampled households, 1.95 percent of them acquired formal SRM -this
number is the lowest percentage of formal adoption observed in the three samples in Mexico
Finally, less than .8 percent reported no application of formal or informal strategy after or before
the occurrence of the disruptive event.
4.2.1.3 Villaflores, Chiapas
4.2.1.3.1 Socioeconomic and demographic profile
Iable 4-6 Villatlores. Descriptive statistics
58 Based on binary observation, associated household= [1,0].
9 Idem.
6o Based on binary observation, household with formal SRM =[1,0].
61 Idem.
4.2.1.3.2 Shocks and SRM profile
4.2.1.3.2.1 Shocks
The 1,700 sampled
households reported a total
of 22,456 observations
distributed into the four
categories of shocks.
Weather was the category
with the highest number of
reported events with 45.67
percent. Flood was the
most frequent weather
shock with
Figure 4-12 Villaflores. Distribution of observations per shock
almost 48 percent of the observations of the weather category. In the health shocks category,
whose observations accounted for 27.83 percent of the total, chronic diseases were the mode
with about 40 percent. Market-related shocks had 22.98 of the observations to be the third most
reported category. In this case, decrease of the quantity demanded had the highest number of
events with 35.67 percent of the observations of the category. From the three surveys, the one
conducted in Villaflores observed the lowest percentage in the category of manmade shocks,
3.52 percent. Inside this category, intoxication or poisoning was the most reported shock with
34.56 percent.
4.2.1.3.2.2 SRM profile
Villaflores
Adoption of SRM per Type
Fo
I
Did not apply
105%
From the 1,700 households
that comprised the sample,
183 received some fashion
of free social risk
management, whose main
source was governmental
funds for vulnerability
reduction.
Figure 4-13 Villaflores. Sample distribution per SRM strategy
Of the remaining 1,517 households, 3.16 percent acquired formal SRM, whilst 1.05 percent
informed not having adopted neither formal nor informal risk-response mechanisms. Over 95.7
percent reported the application of informal strategies -with no use of formal mechanisms.
4.2.2 Tests of association62
The results of the ordered regressions using level of organization and accessibility to
infrastructure as regressors are presented below. The results suggest that association to local
groups acts as an incentive for households to engage in formal social risk management. On the
other hand, contrary to my a priory expectation, proximity to roads, financial services and urban-
62 The coefficient of correlations among the three variables and the regressions results are available in theAnnexes.
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mixed use areas is not relevant a factor for acquiring formal risk-response mechanism despite the
fact that its coefficient is statistically significant and negative (i.e. the larger the distance to
infrastructure is, the lower the likelihood of adoption of formal SRM).
I.JLUJCI VCILIUI 3a I .,OV I .L•.J. I
SR ression.
Regressor
Level of Association
(.09181
constant -(.118
(.118)
(.1901
-L .27L44
(.217)
-. VJ,
(.2021
I.U222
(.222)
Table 4-7 Mexico. Regressions results
(The standard deviations are given in parentheses under the coefficients)
All the individual coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent level.
4.2.2.1 Ahome, Sinaloa
The relationship between adoption of SRM and level of association is relatively weaker in
Ahome's sample than in the other samples 69. Ceteris paribus, the predicted probability of
63 2000 sampled households (HHs) minus 143(HHs with free SRM) minus 53 (HHs with no strategy).
64 2000 HHs minus 201 (HHs with free SRM) minus 14 (HHs with no strategy).
65 The variable adoption of formal SRM has a correlation of .3883 with level of association and of -.0733 with
accessibility to infrastructure.
66 For Ahome' sample, the proportion of the total variance of SRM adoption that is accounted for by the two-
regressor model is 6.8 percent.
67 For Valle de Santiago, The proportion of the total variance of formal/informal SRM adoption that is accounted
for by the two-regressor model is 38.54 percent.
68 Villaflores' sample presented the strongest regression model of the Mexico study by explaining over 43 percent
of the total variance of the adoption of SRM. Likewise, The highest correlation between adoption of SRM and level
of association of the household is observed in Villaflores' sample with .4253. This measure regarding the adoption
of formal SRM and access to infrastructure is -.1157, the second highest after Ahome.
69 Nevertheless, by ordering a probit regression reporting marginal effects, access to infrastructure explained 5.13
percent of the variance of formal SRM, the highest value of the three municipalities.
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adoption of formal SRM by a sampled household from Ahome that has one member affiliated to
a local group and it is located in a distance of one kilometer or less to economic infrastructure
(main roads, financial services and urban-mixed use areas) is 19.48 percent. Conversely, a
household that is not associated and resides farther than 20 kilometers from economic
infrastructure has a probability of .306 percent of voluntarily acquiring or implementing formal
risk-response mechanisms..
4.2.2.2 Valle de Santiago, Guanajuato
Ceteris paribus, a Valle de Santiago's household associated to local groups and having the
shortest range of distance to economic infrastructure has a predicted probability of adoption of
formal SRM of 26.94 percent. On the other hand, a household with no membership to local
groups and located in an area farther than 20 kilometers from economic infrastructure has the
same probability at .044 percent. If a member of a household residing between one and five
kilometers away from the infrastructural area decides to join a local group, the households'
likelihood of adoption increases by 18.54 percent.
4.2.2.3 Villaflores, Chiapas
The predicted probability of adoption of formal SRM by a sampled household from Villaflores
that has one member affiliated to a local group and is located in a distance of one kilometer or
less to economic infrastructure (main roads, financial services and urban-mixed use areas) is
35.60 percent -ceteris paribus. On the contrary, a household that is not associated and resides
farther than 20 kilometers from economic infrastructure has a probability of .006 percent of
acquiring formal SRM. For example, a household with no history of association with local
social networks and located in an area between five and 20 kilometers from the infrastructure is
estimated to increase its likelihood of opting for formal SRM in 9.78 percentage points if one its
family members becomes affiliated to a local group.
5. Conclusions
This thesis provides empirical evidence that a higher level of household's association with
community organizations is related to a higher likelihood of adoption of formal SRM strategies.
Additionally, proximity to economic infrastructure is less strongly correlated with such adoption
,although the relationship is stronger in more-developed environments. I examined the results of
primary data collected through statistical surveys in two countries with high exposure to natural
hazards: India and Mexico (OFDA/CRED 2008). Data for India are from the district of
Kalahandi, Orissa, and data for Mexico are from three municipalities: Ahome, Sinaloa, with a
low level of margination70 and a high level of social development,71 Valle de Santiago, with
medium levels of margination and social development, and Villaflores, Chiapas, with a high
level of margination and a low level of social development.
In particular, I observed that the discrete change of the variable level of association from zero to
one (where 1 means that one member of the household is affiliated with a local group) results in
a marginal increase of the likelihood that a household will opt into formal SRM by 13.85 percent
in Kalahandi, by 8.625 percent in Ahome, by 19.18 percents in Valle de Santiago and by 22.25
percent in Villaflores, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the relevance of a household's association
with local groups in the process of acquiring formal SRM can be inferred from the results of the
two-regressor probit model ordered with the data from the surveys conducted in the three
Mexican municipalities. For instance, the results suggest that a Villaflores household located
70 Based on the Index of Margination (CONAPO 2006).
71 Measured with the Social Development Index (CONAPO 2003).
between one and five kilometers from economic infrastructure would increase its probability of
engaging in formal risk-response strategies from 0.181 percent to 20.25 percent by joining a
local group.
At the same time, proximity to infrastructure appears to be less relevant to the household's
decision to obtain formal SRM than the role of social capital. Reducing the index of proximity to
infrastructure72 by one point (discrete change) would increase the probability of acquiring formal
risk management by 1.02 percent in Valle de Santiago, by 2.02 percent in Villaflores, and by
5.13 percent in Ahome. To illustrate the point, if a household in Valle de Santiago with no
affiliation to local groups moves from 20 kilometers to 500 meters away from economic
infrastructure, its probability of engaging in formal SRM increases by 0.55 percentage points;
but if the same household stays at the same location and joins a local group, this probability
improves by 7.65 percentage points. These findings are robust even with the diversity in
socioeconomic, demographic and environmental characteristics of the municipalities described in
Chapter Three.
5.1 The level of development of the community and the effect of
the household association in the adoption of formal SRM
The results suggest that the lower the level of community development, the larger the effect of
the discrete change of the variable level of association on the probability of acquiring formal
SRM. For example, take an Ahome household residing six kilometers from economic
72 The ranges of this index are 1: less than one kilometer, 2: between one and five kilometers, 3: between five and
20 kilometers, 4: more than 20 kilometers.
infrastructure; if one of its members joints a local group, its likelihood of adopting formal SRM
increases 9.65 percentage points. In contrast, in Villaflores, the comparable situation would lead
to an increase of 34.87 percentage points in a household's likelihood of adopting formal SRM.
The effect is consistent in the three Mexican municipalities; i.e. the effect of level of association
that was observed with Valle de Santiago's sample was higher than for Ahome but lower than for
Villaflores. The identification of the factors behind this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this
research, and it raises some interesting prospects for further analysis: (1) While I consider the
general level of development of the community and not the particular household's standard of
living (e.g. income level), the integration of this variable would enrich the assessment. (2) The
data do not exhibit a trend that can help predict the direct effect of the level of community
development on the likelihood of adopting formal SRM. In fact, the share of sampled
households with formal SRM is 4.11 percentage points higher in Ahome, the most-developed of
the three municipalities, than in Villaflores, the least-developed; but the share in Villaflores is
1.22 percentage points higher than in Valle de Santiago, which has a medium level of
development. (3) Likewise, there is no evidence on the effect of the level of urbanization factors
on the decision; in Ahome, over 74 percent of the population lives in urban areas, in Villaflores
61 percent do, and in Valle de Santiago 50 percent do.
5.1.1 A note on the role of informal risk management
Throughout the discussion, I have directly and indirectly stressed the advantages of formal over
informal SRM strategies in the presence of systemic risks. However, there are a number of rural
communities in India and Mexico (and, indeed, around the world) where sophisticated informal
strategies that proved effective for decades in managing the risks of potentially hazardous
environments. In those cases, vulnerability arises when there are changes to the socioeconomic
and demographic characteristics that have shaped such coping systems over many generations.
Generally speaking, informal strategies might be effective against some types of idiosyncratic
risks and, in SRM systems, their scope should be complemented by formal mechanisms through
networks of synergy between the community and external agents. Bardhan and Udry (2007)
provide an account of consumption-smoothing practices that achieve an efficient allocation of
individual risk within the community. They show that the marginal utility of any household is a
monotonically increasing function of average village consumption. In a Pareto-efficient
allocation, the temporary changes in income are fully pooled at the community level. The only
risks faced by the household are systemic hazards affecting the community. That is precisely the
risk threshold that necessitates the addition of formal mechanisms.
5.2 Some points for further research
The results presented here could be strengthened in several ways. One way is by considering
additional variables, such as the capability of groups to provide their members with linkages to
formal risk-hedging solutions. This variable could explain the differences in the level of positive
effect of a household's level of association on the likelihood of municipalities adopting formal
strategies. In itself, that capability can be affected by the existence of external formal risk-
management providers in the community. Likewise, the quality of infrastructure can also affect
the results regarding the role of proximity to infrastructure in the likelihood of adoption.
Additionally, further analysis could illuminate how the nature of the association accounts for the
explanation of the variance of adoption of SRM. The descriptive statistics illustrated that the
majority of the households with formal SRM and affiliation are members of economic groups,
e.g. farmers' associations. It may be possible to infer whether the type of social network
determines the frequency and depth of different risk-response mechanisms that can be
summoned during disruptive events .
Another limitation of this research derives from the cross-sectional nature of the dataset, which
prevents the study of the longitudinal effects of the socioeconomic and demographic variables on
SRM adoption. Since the information is captured "as of the date of the survey" most of the
variables turn out to be stocks rather than flows, apart from some particular questions that try to
gauge the change in a variable over time. Risk analytics are driven mostly by loss experience
distributions and flows, which are difficult to derive in short spans like the ones comprising the
survey. Thus, it is important to note that the structure of the questionnaire might increase the
probability of a forced relationship created in people's mind regarding the shock and the SRM.
That may imply that cause-effect phenomena did not necessarily occur, but that the respondent
drew the connection while answering the survey. A more descriptive survey tracking
households' actions and hazards over time would improve the study by suggesting a potential
connection between the two events that should be inferred by the researcher rather than explicitly
listed by the household.
Although these results suggest that lack of infrastructure is not a binding constraint for the
development of SRM systems in developing countries, they do not rule out the effectiveness of
infrastructure investment as a tool for reducing vulnerability in developing countries; such an
assessment is beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, the findings suggests a new way of
approaching the task of creating SRM networks since the traditional and widespread assumption
n Some ideas regarding the potential factors associated with the effect of community-based groups and formal
SRM adoption that could be the topic of further research are presented in the Annexes.
is that market-based solutions are commercially prohibitive in infrastructurally depressed areas,
like some localities of Kalahandi, Valle de Santiago, and Villaflores. In this endeavor, the
linkage with community-based groups could be a powerful tool. In this sense, the promotion of
social capital could represent a cornerstone for investment in SRM since, as this research's
statistical evidence suggests, community-based groups are valuable not only as a tool to manage
risk themselves, but also as a means to foster the adoption of formal risk-response mechanisms.
Annexes
Surveys' Findings
Study in India
Kalahandi, Orissa
Socioeconomic and demographic profile
Around 53.33 percent of the respondents belonged to the Scheduled Tribes (STs) category, 7.29
percent were Scheduled Castes (SCs), 19.17 percent were from Other Backward Classes (OBCs)
and the rest 20 percent were from other social groups. Around 32 percent of the households
could be identified as BPL (Below Poverty Line) households based on their possession of the
BPL card issued by the government. This is higher than the national average but much lower
than the district average of around 60 percent of households being BPL households (Office of the
Registrar General & Census Commissioner 2002).
Economic activity
In Golamunda, 95.12 percent of the households were engaged in self-employed agriculture and
only 4.88 percent were self-employed in non-agriculture. Around 93 percent of those self-
employed in agriculture worked in their principal activity for eight months and hardly five
percent found employment for all the 12 months of the last year in their principal activity. This is
asymptotic of the problems of migration and absence of enough productive subsidiary activities
or avenues of non-farm employment in the rural sector. In Bhawanipatna, the picture is
completely different as 52 percent of the respondents households reported self-employment as
the principal economic activity, 30 percent were salaried class or regular wage earners and 18
percent were casual laborers.
Income level
Around 90 percent of the sampled households have its main income source in the primary sector.
Around 85.63 percent of the sampled households reported to have operated on any land in the
last 365 days. Around 78.33 percent of the households fell into the monthly expenditure class of
500-1000 Indian Rupees (Rs) which works out to be an annual expenditure bracket of 6,000 to
12,000 Rs. Only 3.13 percent spent less than 500 Rs a month while 15.83 percent fell into the
1001-5000 Rs bracket, with 2.71 per cent spending more than 5000 Rs a month. However,
analyzing only the households surveyed in Golamunda, 85.51 percent of the households fell into
the expenditure bracket of 500 to l000 Rs compared to eight percent in the Bhawanipatna
sample. The contrast becomes more prominent when it was found that 66 percent of urban
households fell into the 1001-5000 Rs per month expenditure bracket with around 26 percent
shelling out more than 5000 a month. Monthly household consumption expenditure by social
group reveals that around 70 percent of the predominant ST groups fell into the mean monthly
expenditure class of 500-1000 where as for SCs it was 89 percent. In the case of OBCs it was 86
percent and for others it was 90 per cent.
Education level
From the members of the sampled households, 21.2 percent were illiterate, 24.17 percent
attained literacy from non-formal education, 22.92 percent had below primary level education,
8.13 percent had primary education and 6.46 percent had middle school education. Less than 1.3
percent was registered for respondents having secondary education, though 8.54 percent had
higher secondary education.
Assets ownership
Housing
From the sampled households, 83.5 percent has property rights (for land holding and house
ownership) and 7.5 percent reported having had transaction of their immovable assets in the last
one year. 75.4 percent of the households were based out of Kutcha houses whilst 20.4 were in
semi-pucca. The rest resided out of Pucca houses .
Livestock
Around 11 percent own non-descript cattle, two percent own cross-breeds. Buffaloes are reared
by three percent. Sheep, goat, pigs are reared by very few (less than 10 percent for each
category) and chicken, hen, cock and ducks are owned by around 30 percent of the households.
Household appliances and means of transportation, work and load
Around 31 percent of the households own radio while 25.6 percent own television sets.
Possession of at least one fan or bulb was observed in 23.7 percent of the households indicating
low penetration of electricity consumption as compared with national levels (Office of the
Registrar General & Census Commissioner 2002). In terms of modes of transportation, around
77 percent of the households own at least one bicycle and carts (hand-pulled and bullock-driven)
are possessed by around 21 percent of the households sampled. Around 7 percent own
motorcycles and tractors and trailers combined are owned (mostly rented ones go in as owned in
most of the cases) by around 8 percent of the households.
Financial services penetration
Around 45 percent of the sample households reported to have borrowed from formal institutional
sources, with cooperative bank societies dominating the scene with 20.42 percent of the loans.
The rest of the surveyed households borrowed from informal sources like landlords, money
lenders , relatives and friends. Around 19 percent of the households that have borrowed took
loan with the purpose of expenditure in farm business; whilst around seven percent, for
expenditure in non-farm business. On the other hand, 18 percent use the loan for household
consumption expenditure. Around 15 percent of the households own government certificates
(Indira Vikas Patra, Kisan Vikas Patra, and KCC). Post Office Deposits are held by an abysmal 7
percent of the sampled households. 16.25 percent have deposits with commercial banks. But
Self-Help Groups (SHGs) deposits outnumber in terms of popularity and stand at around 43
percent of the households. Around six percent has pension or provident fund subscriptions whilst
other six percent holds cash in hand.
Study in Mexico
Ahome, Sinaloa
Socioeconomic and demographic profile
Out of the surveyed households in Ahome, 46.87 are employed and receiving a wage, 41.23
percent have the majority of their family members working in their own business, 9.32 percent
work in short periods, and 2.58 percent are unemployed. The vast majority earns 10,000 MXP or
more monthly, 29.67 percent receive between 6,000 MXP and 10,000 MXP; whilst 12.92
percent, less than 6,000 MXP but more than 3,000 MXP. Around three percent receive less than
two minimum wages per day -i.e. about ten USD.
Around 3 percent of the surveyed households have illiterate members, 16.43 percent can write
and read but have not being enrolled in a school. 19.43 have an average educational level 74 of
primary education and 16.23 of secondary school. The highest concentration of households is in
an average educational attainment of high school, 23.13. It is important to note that Ahome has
the highest percentage of sampled households that have attended college or higher education
from the three municipalities with 12.87 percent.
Level of association
In comparison with the other two municipalities, Ahome has the highest level of association
with more than 32 percent of the sampled households having at least one member affiliated to a
local social or economic group; almost half of them below to an economic organization with
fishery associations being the mode. Around 23 percent of the households are affiliated to one of
them, whilst 27.25 percent have membership with both social and economic groups.
Access to infrastructure and social services
Almost half of the sample is located one or less kilometers away from main roads. As a matter of
fact, 79 percent of the surveyed households have at least one main road in a distance of five or
less kilometers. Less than eight percent of the sample is located farther than 20 kilometers from
any main road. The proximity to roads is a trend that holds for the rest of the spatial distribution
of infrastructure in Ahome. For instance, almost 92 percent of the sample is five or less
kilometers away from some type of financial institution or financial services facility. Hospitals or
74 As per the case of job status, educational level is calculated with weighted averages. For the latter, I use the
educational attainment of every family member taking into account their age.
other health facilities and primary schools are in a distance of five or less kilometers to more
than 85 and 93 percent of the surveyed households, respectively. Almost 72 percent of the
sample is situated one or less kilometers away of urban-mixed use areas (i.e. markets). Finally,
access to electricity is constant for more than 97 percent of the sample. Thus, less than one
percent of the surveyed households lack this service.
Valle de Santiago, Guanajuato
Socioeconomic and demographic profile
From the sample in Valle de Santiago, 46.31 percent of the households have an average job
status of self-employed. On the other hand, 27.56 percent work for others receiving a wage and
19.34 are temporary workers. This municipality presented the highest rate of unemployment in
the sample with 6.79 percent (almost three times higher than Ahome's figure). In terms of
average monthly income, 42.34 percent of the sample earns between 6,000 MXP and 10,000
MXP; 23.94 percent, less than 3,000 MXP; 23.87, between 3,000 MXP and 6,000 MXP. Almost
ten percent receives more than 10,000 MXP per month.
Regarding the educational level of the sampled households, only 1.18 percent reported having
college or higher degrees, 2.56 percent has attended technical school and 16.45 percent and 13.2
percent has completed secondary and high school, respectively. The vast majority has an
educational attainment equal or lower than primary education and the illiteracy rate of the sample
is 10.45 percent.
Level of association
Valle de Santiago presents the lowest level of association of the three municipalities with less
than 10 percent of the households having at least one member in local group. From them, 47.27
percent have membership with economic organizations, especially vendors associations, almost
30 percent are association with social groups, and 23.19 percent have an affiliation with both
types of group.
Access to infrastructure
Most of the sampled households in Valle de Santiago (58 percent) are situated farther than five
kilometers from at least one main road, whereas less than 20 percent are one kilometer or less
away. In this same distance, the proportion is larger for the case of health centers with more than
60 percent. Regarding this type of social facility, around 20 percent of the surveyed household
can be located in one kilometer or less. The situation is completely different in the case of
proximity to primary schools since more than 86 percent are located in five or less kilometers
away from at least one school. More than 68 percent of the sample can find a bank branch, ATM,
microfinance institution center or other type of financial services facility in a distance of five or
less kilometers; 23 percent, between five and 20 kilometers. Almost 50 percent of the surveyed
households are farther than five kilometers from urban-mixed use areas. The provision of
electricity is continuous for 94.15 percent of the sample and around .29 percent of the surveyed
samples reside in localities with no energy provision.
Villaflores, Chiapas
Socioeconomic and demographic profile
The majority of the sampled households in Villaflores are self-employed. Furthermore,
Villaflores has the lowest percentage of waged households with 17.45 (almost 20 percentage
points less than value in Ahome), and the highest percentage of temporal workers from the
three municipalities, 25.78 percent. Unemployment accounts for 4.21 percent of the sample.
Almost 28 percent receives less than 3,000 MXP monthly, the highest percentage at this income
range from the three targeted communities. Likewise, around 40 percent earns between 3,000
MXP and 6,000 MXP. 28.45 percent is in the range of 6,000 MXP and 10,000 MXP and only
4.13 percent in surpasses the 10,000 MXN average per month -it represents more than 50
percentage points that the figure in Ahome.
Villaflores' illiteracy rate is the highest of the study, 19.04 percent. Less than two percent of the
sample has attended technical school, college or higher, whilst 36.52 percent is literate but has
not attended school. 20.31 percent has primary school; 12.73 percent, secondary; and 9.34, high
school.
Level of association
Almost 14 percent of the sampled households in Villaflores have an affiliation to a local group.
They are nearly evenly distributed between economic and social groups. The mode of economic
groups is farming associations and the percentage of surveyed households belonging to this type
of group is 43.87 percent. On the other hand, 40.91 percent of the households are affiliated with
social groups. Households associated with both social and economic groups account for 15.22 of
the sample with some type of membership.
Access to infrastructure
Based on the surveys' results, it is possible to infer that Villaflores is the most infrastructurally
depressed municipality from the study carried out in Mexico. For instance, around 60 percent of
the sample in Villaflores is located farther than five kilometers from any main road. The
municipality presented the lowest proportion of sampled households residing in proximity of one
kilometer or less to roads - about 15 percent. However, financial services are available for more
than 85 percent of the sample in a distance of five or less kilometers. In addition to this,
Villaflores has the lowest percentage from the three municipalities of sampled units residing
farther than 20 kilometers from financial services -1.7 percent. Regarding social infrastructure,
Villaflores' sample presents the less level of proximity of the three municipalities. For example
and despite the fact that around 70 percent of the sample is located in less than five kilometers of
proximity to a health facility, almost 20 percent lives farther than 20 kilometers (the highest
figure in this area of the Mexico study). In the case of primary schools, around 36 percent of the
sample lives in a distance of one kilometer or less, whilst 13.54 percent resides the mark of 20
kilometers -which represents 13 percentage points more than in the case of Ahome and around
11 percentage points more than Valle de Santiago. Urban-mixed use areas are in a distance of
five kilometers or less for around 30 percent of the sample. In the case of energy, Villaflores
rates the worst standards of the three Mexican municipalities. About 1.25 percent of the sampled
households lack electricity in the house and 0.68 in the community. About six percent of the
sample has intermittent access to this service and, thus, 92.14 percent has continuous service
throughout the day.
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The role of social capital in the establishment of formal SRM
systems- Ideas for further research
The research results regarding the relationship between level of association of the household and
adoption of formal SRM have a number of interpretations that should be assessed in a methodic
fashion. However, I suggest some hypotheses that could guide further research on the topic.
i. Community organizations encourage individuals to access risk-management markets.
Community organizations may not only improve access to financial services by
providing social collateral and reputation to their members, but they may also foster
the regional integration of the community as the group expands and seeks new
markets. Granovetter (1995) calls this mechanism coupling and decoupling.
Moreover, other authors75 suggest that linkages to external agents are built
incrementally; in that case, a local stock of social capital in the form of community-
based groups might be the first phase. One lesson from fieldwork on economic
community-based organizations is that, once a few members have understood and
adopted market-based solutions, others in the group are more inclined to adopt them
as well; in other words, peer evidence is persuasive.
ii. Community organizations help establish commercial risk management. In Chapter Three,
I presented some evidence of how risk-management providers reduce problems like
moral hazard and a lack of distribution channels through their association with
community organizations. Collective action among people who know one another has
been a useful mechanism for obtaining information and for monitoring, which could
be key elements for overcoming the effects of asymmetric information (J. Skees, Risk
7s See for example (Saegert, Thompson and Warren 2002).
Management Challenges in Rural Financial Markets: Blending Risk Management
Innovations with Rural Finance 2004, UNDP 2004, OFDA/CRED 2008). An example
briefly mentioned in this document is the case of Fondos, the agricultural mutual
insurance funds run by farmers that have been the backbone of the development of
agriculture insurance market in Mexico (Mayoral 2008, Agroasemex 2006).
Additionally, the role of community organizations might be evidenced in the
evolution of microfinancial markets in less developed environments like Kalahandi.
These are examples of forging linkages with community-based organizations to take
advantage of their market knowledge and accessibility rather than competing with,
large private companies.76
76 Worth analyzing is the case of cooperation between ICICI Bank and the microfinance institution Basix that has
boosted the market of weather index-based insurance in India. Some information on this is available in Chapter
Three.
Questionnaire applied in Mexico
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
ESTUDIO SOBRE ADMINISTRACION DE RIESGO
ENCUESTA SOCIOECON6MICA Y DE EXPOSICI6N AL RIESGO
[ Particulares de la operaci6n de campo
1 Nombre del encuestador
2 Fecha de encuesta Dia Mes AfioI T I
3 No. Identificaci6n de brea 4 No. Identificaci6n de hogar
4 Tiempo de encuesta (minutos)
5
6 N6mero de visitas para realizar la
encuesta
7 Firma
[1 Identificaci6n descriptiva del hogar
1 Estado 2 Municipio
3 Colonia
4 Calle 8 No. exterior 9 No. interior
5 Nombre del jefe (a) de familia No. Miembros en el hogar
6 Nombre del encuestado (a) 7
7 C6digo de respuesta 1-cooperativo y capaz, 2- cooperativo, pero no capaz, 3- ocupado,
I 4- renuente, 9- otro
[1 Actividad productiva y membresia1 C6digo de principal fuente de ingreso del hogar 21 C6digo principal sector de ocupaci6n
3 La familia o alg6n integrante de la familia
es parte de alguna etnia indigena -
iCu l(es)?
4 Algiin integrante de la familia es o ha sido 5 i.Cunto tiempo
miembro de alguna organizaci6n/ ha sido o fue
asociaci6n/ grupo/ empresarial o miembro?
comercial (por ejemplo: cooperativa, (Ahos, meses)
ejidal) -LCubl?
6 Algin integrante de la familia es o ha sido 7 ZCubnto tiempo
miembro de alguna organizaci6n/ ha sido o fue
asociaci6n/ grupo/ social, recreativa o miembro?
religiosa -ZCubl? (Afos, meses)
8 Algin integrante de la familia es o ha sido 9 LCubnto tiempo
beneficiario de alg6n esquema de ha sido o fue
apoyo del gobierno, ONG u otro miembro?
proyecto- eCu~? (Aios, meses)
C6digos 1.1: 1- Empresario o autoempleado, 2- Asalariado, 3- Trabajador eventual, 4- Desempleado
C6digos 1.2: 1- Agricultura o ganaderia, 2- Manufactura, 3- Servicios
[2] As ectos de ogrrficos y otros particulares de los miembros del hogar
No. Sexo Edad Estado civil Nivel de Estado Actividad econ6mica
Miem (hombre- (c6digo 2.1) educaci6n de salud Principal (o 6nica) Subsidiaria (si hay)
bro 1, mujer (c6digo 2.2) (c6digo Estatus No. de Estatus No. de
2) 2.3) (c6d. meses (c6d. meses
2.4) trabajados 2.4) trabajados
en el en el
61_timo ailo 61timo afio
C6digos 2.1: 1- Soltero, 2- Casado, 3- Concubinato, 4- Divorciado/Separado, 5- Viudo
C6digos 2.2: 1- No saber leer o escribir, 2- Sabe leer y escribir, pero no fue a la escuela, 3- Primaria, 4- Secundaria,
5- Preparatoria, 6- Carrera t~cnica, 7- Licenciatura o m•s, 99- Otro
C6digos 2.3: 1- Buena salud, 2- Enfermo recurrente, 3- En recuperaci6n
C6digos 2.4: 1- Empresario o autoempleado, 2- Asalariado, 3- Trabajador eventual, 4- Desempleado
3] Ingreso MENSUAL del hogar
1 Menos de 3,000 Pesos
2 Entre 3,000 y 6,000 Pesos
3 Entre 6,000 y 10,000 Pesos
4 Mas de 10,000 Pesos
[4] Actives del hogar.
4.A.Terrenos y bienes inmuebles destinados a la habitaci6n
En/Aste /as siqi ientes caracterhticas de los bienes inn u a
C6digos 4.A.1: 1- Casa, 2- 
ir
C6digos 4.A.2: 1- Con titulo de propiedad, 2- Sin titulo de propiedad 3- Hipotecado, 4- La familia renta, 5- La familialo renta (a alguien mis), 7- Propiedad ejidal, 6- Intestado, 9- Otro
C6digos 4.A.3: 1- Adquisici6n total, 2- Venta total, 3- Adquisici6n parcial, 4- Venta parcial, 5- Arrendamiento
No. Tipo Area Estatus Tiempo que la familia Modificaciones
Activo (c6digo (metros cuadrados) (c6digo lo ha ocupado durante el filtimo afio
4.A.1) 4.A.2) (c6digo 4.A.4)
f",•* ~ ~ ~  ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ / faI: AA4. mil- br•.. J .. L-" "I
a 
l familia
f
4.B. Terrenos y bienes inmuebles utilizados comercialmente
En/ste /as sh; vientes ca'acterhticas d? /os bient s inmuebles go? Ia fam o
oadigos 4.B.1: 1- Agricultura o ganadena, L-
consultorio, despacho, escuela, u otro servicio
L>cal para producci6n (fibrica o taller), 4- Tienta, comercia dora,
C6digos 4.B.2: 1- Con titulo de propiedad, 2- Sin titulo de propiedad 3- Hipotecado, 4- La familia renta, 5- La familia
lo renta (a alguien m6s), 7- Propiedad ejidal, 6- Intestado, 9- Otro
C6digos 4.B.3: 1- Adquisici6n total, 2- Venta total, 3- Adquisici6n parcial, 4- Venta parcial, 5- Arrendamiento, 6- Otro
4.C. Ganado
Enliste el ganado que la familla posee
No. Especie poseida Nu'mero Transacciones durante el
Activo (porcinos, vacunos, ovinos, aves, otros) 61timo aio (c6digo 4.C.1)
Codigos 4.C.1: 0- Ninguna, 1- Compra, 2- venta, 3- Entrega prendana (pago de crealto), 4- Kecepcion prenaana kpor
dinero prestado), 99- Otro
4.D. Electrodom6sticos y otros activos
_El hogar cuenta con alguno de los siguientes bienes?
No. Activo Nuimero Transacciones durante el C6digos 4.D.1:
Id. 61timo aFio (c6digo 4.D.1) 1- Compra, 2- Venta,3- Entrega prendaria (pago1 Televisi6n
2_ Radio de crddito),
2 Radio 4- Recepci6n (por dinero
3 Computadora prestado)
4 Refrigerador
5 Estufa
No. Tipo Uso Area Estatus Tiempo que Modificaciones Productos cultivados o
Activo (c6digo (c6digo (metros (c6digo la familia lo durante el manufacturados, ganado
4.B.1) 4.B.2) cuadrados) 4.C.2) ha poseido iltimo ailo criado servicios
(c6digo 4.4) realizados
7, = . , I • C. , I I ,• )rom • • || • , I • , •
4.E. Medios de transporte y carga
dB hoar conta 
con a/ 7no de 
los siqu 
s'
No. Id. Activo Nuimero Transacciones durante el
1ltimo afo (c6digo 4.E.1)
1 Auto
2 Motocicleta
3 Cami6n (camioneta) de
carga o transporte
4 Tractor
5 Arado
6 Bicicleta
7 Otro (especifique):
C6digos 4.E.1:
1- Compra, 2- Venta,
3- Entrega prendaria(pago de crdlito),
4- Recepci6n (por
dinero prestado)
[5] Acceso a infraestructura
5.A. Servicios p6blicos y de comunicaci6n
dH hogar cue nta con los siquientes 
servicios?
No. Id. Servicio Tipo de provisi6n
(c6digo 5.A.1)
1 Energia el-ctrica
2 Agua potable
3 Drenaje
4 Teldfono
5 Internet
6 Irrigaci6n para agricultura
C6digos 5.A.1:
1- Continuo, 2- Intermitente
durante el dia, 3- No disponible en
el hogar, pero existente en la
comunidad, 4- No existente en la
comunidad
5.B. Servicios sociales
d Cud/ es la dirtancia desde el hoqur 1 
?
C6digos 5.B.1:
1- Menos de 1 kil6metro,
2- Entre 1 y 5 kil6metros,
3- Entre 5 y 20
kil6metros,
4- Mas de 20 kil6metros
No. Id. Servicio Distancia desde el
hogar hasta el
servicio mas cercano
(c6digo 5.B.1)
1 Centro de salud
2 Escuela primaria
3 Escuela secundaria
4 Universidad
5 Linea de Transporte normalmente utilizado
6 Carretera principal (regional)
7 Estaci6n de policia
8 Oficina de gobierno
9 Mercado o centro de abasto
[6] Exposici6n a servicios financieros
A .6 Acceso geo
gr6fico 
a serviclos 
f 
s
(5digos 6.A.1: 1- Menos de 1 kil6metro, 2- Entre 1 y 5 kil6metros, 3- Entre 5 y 20 kil6metros,
4- Mbs de 20 kil6metros
6.B Uso de servicios financieros
No. lAlgdn integrante de la familia ha usado alguno de los siguientes servicios durante el dltimo
Id. a/o?
Prestamo No Si Nombre de la organizaci6n que Uso principalprest6 el servicio (c6digo 6.B.1)
1 Bancario
2 De microfinanciera
3 De cooperativa
4 De instituci6n piblica o
gobierno
5 De vecino, amigo, u otra
persona fisica
6 De otro medio
.CuPl?-
C6digos 6.B.1:
1- Utilizaci6n para empezar o expandir el negocio, 2- Necesidades bWsicas del hogar,
3- Gastos educativos, 4- Gastos por enfermedad o muerte, 5- Gastos por eventos climbticos o catastr6ficos,
6- Renovaci6n o construcci6n del hogar, 7- Cr~dito automotriz, 8- Compra de electrodomesticos, 9- Otro uso
No. MAIgdn integrante de la familia ha usado alguno de los siguientes servicios durante el iltimo
Id. ago?
Ahorro o inversi6n No Si Nombre de la organizaci6n que prest6 el servicio
1 Bancario
2 Con microfinanciera
3 Con cooperativa
4 Con instituci6n publica o gobierno
5 Con vecino, amigo, u otra persona NO APLICA
fisica
6 Con otro medio
.Cusl?-
No. Instituci6n o servicio Distancia desde el hogar
Id. hasta elservicio mis cercano
(c6digo 5.B.1)
1 Banco
2 Caja de ahorro
3 Microfinanciera
4 Cajero automatico
5 Otra organizaci6n financiera o servicio financiero,
i.cul?
c
Exposici6n al riesgo
Identifique los pr-inci/ales roblemas a los aue el hoaar se ha enfrentado. Sd61o anote los eventos v periodos que se acuerde con seuridad
Descripci6n del evento
eCu6ntas veces ha
ocurrido el evento?
En el
iltimo
afio
Entre
uno y
cinco
Entre
cinco y
mis aios
.Efectos
del
evento?
(C6digo
A 11
LQud tan extendido
en la comunidad fue
el evento?
(C6digo 6.2)
Antes de que ocurriera el
evento, .c6mo se prepar6
o se prepara la familia para
reducir su impacto?
triArlin Ai A
Una vez ocurrido el evento,
Iqud hizo o hace la familia
para superar los efectos del
evento? (C6digo 6.4)
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
Q.J.
4.2
4.3
4.4
insumos
Escasez de insumos
Cambio dristico en el precio
del producto
Reducci6n de la demanda
Eliminaci6n de subsidios o
programa de apoyos
P6rdida del emoleo asalariado
Incenato o explosion
Acto criminal (robo,
destrucci6n de propiedad,
secuestro, otro)
Eliminaci6n de servicios
p6blicos o infraestructura
Intoxicaci6n o envenenamiento
por contaminaci6n de agua,
aire o suelo
Naturaleza
del evento
2
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fausaaos
por el
hombre
rrrri ruwv
I Efecto
D
1 P6rdida de la
salud o vida
2 P6rdida de
bienes
materiales o
fuente de
ingreso
3 Ambos
4 Ninguno
C6digo 6.2
Efecto
S61o afect6 mi
hogar
Afect6 otros
hogares en la
comunidad
Afect6 toda la
comunidad
Afect6 la
comunidad y
otras cercanas
1
2
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
2
1
5
La familia o alg6n integrante emigr6 de la
comunidad
Los nifios u otros miembros de la familia
empezaron a trabajar
Produjo algo mds o consigui6 un nuevo
trabajo
Vendi6 activos o ganado
Pidi6 prestado de amigos, familiares u
otros miembros de la comunidad
Hizo mbs resistente la construcci6n de la
casa
Acumul6 materias primas, alimentos u
otros bienes
Empefi6 bienes
Hipotec6 o vendi6 la casa o el terreno
Redujo consumo
Otra estrategia realizada SIN el apoyo del
gobierno, ONG u otro organismo
Pidi6 cr6dito de bancos, microfinanciera,
gobierno o proveedor que ayudaron al
hogar a estar mejor preparado contra el
evento
El gobierno, ONG u otro organismo hizo
obras de infraestructura que prepar6
mejor al hogar o
comunidad contra el evento
Ahorr6 en bancos, microfinanciera,
gobierno, ONG u otro organismo para usar
el dinero cuando
ocurriera algin problema
Compr6 un seguro
Recibi6 aseguramiento gratuito, materias
primas, alimentos, asesoramiento,
capacitaci6n u otro apoyo material o
t6cnico del gobierno, ONG u otro
organismo
Otra estrategia realizada CON el apoyo del
gobierno, ONG u otro organismo
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Efecto
La familia o alg6n
integrante emigr6 de la
comunidad
Los niios u otros
miembros de la familia
empezaron a trabajar
Produjo algo mbs o
consigui6 un nuevo
trabajo
Vendi6 activos o ganado
Pidi6 prestado de amigos,
familiares o vecinos
Uso materias primas,
alimentos u otros bienes
acumulados
Empefi6 bienes
Hipotec6 o vendi6 la casa
o el terreno
Redujo consumo
Otra estrategia realizada
SIN el apoyo del gobierno,
ONG u otro organismo
Pidi6 cr~dito de bancos,
microfinanciera, gobierno
o proveedor
Recibi6 materias primas,
alimentos asesoramiento,
capacitaci6n u otro apoyo
material o t~cnico del
gobierno, ONG u otro
organismo
Uso dinero ahorrado en
bancos, microfinanciera,
gobierno, ONG u otro
organismo
Otra estrategia realizada
CON el apoyo del
gobierno, ONG u otro
organ ismo
No hizo nada
- I----------4
I I
Schedule 18.2 Visit -I : 97
Questionnaire applied in India
SOCIO-ECONOMIC SURVEY
FIRST ROUND : JULY 2007
HOUSEHOLD/ GROUP SCHEDULE 1
0] descriptive identification of
1. state/u.t.: ORISSA 5. hamlet name/ address
2. district: KALAHANDI 6. block:
3. tehsil/town : 7. name of head of household:
4. village name: 8. name of informant:
[1] Identification of sample household
item
item code
no.
Srl. number of sample
village/ block
5. sector (rural-I, urban-2)
6. state-region OR
8. sample household number
9. Response Code
CODES FOR BLOCK 1
Response code : co-operative & capable-1,
others-9.
co-operative but not capable-2, busy-3, reluctant-4,
[2] Particulars of Field Operation
SI. item Investigator
no.
1. name (block letters)
2. date(s) of: DD MM YY
survey/ inspection
4. total time taken to canvass
schedule 1 (in minutes)
5. Signature
[3] Household characteristics
1. No of members in the 8. Monthly household income
household (Household Size) Less than Rs 500
. hni mphnlrl tyme
(Agriculture/Non-Agricultural
Activities as the main Rs 500-999
occupation)
3. social group (code)
Rs 1000-5000
whether operated any land for
4. agricultural activities during last More than Rs 5000
365 days (yes-1, no-2)
(Cultivator) 9. Monthly household expenditure
5. Are you BPL? (Yes/No) Less than Rs 500
6. Are you a member of any SHG Rs 500-999
or cooperative? (Yes/No)
Are you a beneficiary of any Rs 1000-5000
7. other scheme from the
government, NGO or other
Codes fonrni Bvock 3 scnr grfup
Codes for Block 3 social group:
scheduled tribe-i scheduled caste-2, other backward class-3, others-9.
[4] Demographic and other particulars of household members
SI. Present Health Sex age marital general usual activity
no. return status status education(male-i (years) (code) Principal subsidiary(economic)
female-2) (code) status No. of months status No of months
(code) worked in last (code) worked in last
Codes for Block 4
Marital Status Code: never married - 1, currently married - 2, widowed - 3, divorced/ seperated - 4
General education code:
not literate - 01,
literate without formal schooling - 02,
literate but below primary -03,
primary - 04,
middle - 05,
secondary - 06,
higher secondary - 07,
diploma/certificate course - 08,
graduate -10,
post graduate and above - 11.
Health status: normal- 1, disable- 2
Usual Activity Code
self-employed in non-agriculture-1,
agricultural labour-2,
other labour-3,
self-employed in agriculture-4,
others-9.
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] 5[ Assets: 
Land 
Own 
y
area owned (Acres)
Up Medium land Low land
Use (Name of the crops in each
category)
Up land Medium Land Low land
Present return (Kg per acre)
Up land Medium land Low land
Irrigated/ Rain-fed
Up land Medium Land Low land
)o you have property titles for your land? (Yes/No)
)id you have any transactions (sale/purchase) in your land? (Yes/No)
[f yes, please specify the year
Are there current irrigation facilities in the village? (Yes/No)
If yes, please specify
Nhether Beneficiary of NREG or Any Other Govt. Scheme? (Please Specify If Yes)
[6] Buildings and Other Constructions hold by Household
SI. no. of survey number or other Type value as on the date of survey
identification particulars
plot Kutcha Pucca Semi-pucca (Rs.)
Did you have any transactions (sale/purchase) in your house? (Yes/No)
If yes, please specify the year
SI. no.
plot
I.-- I ... . . . ...  . .... .... r . . . . - -. . .. i
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[7] Livestock and Poultry Ownership
SI. no owned as on date of survey
Item No
1. cattle- cross bred
2. cattle- non-descript
3. Buffalo
4. Bullock
5. Sheep
6. Goat
7. Pig
8. Rabbit
9. Cock
10. Hen
11. Chicken
12. Duck & duckling
15. Other poultry birds*
16 Others
[8] Durable Assets:
Do you have electricity connection? (Yes/No) ---------------------
SI. No. Item Owned as on date of survey Quantity
1 TV
2 Radio
3 Record Player/Tape
Recorder/Stereo
4 VCD/DVD/Other players
5 Pressure Cooker
6 Electric equipments
(i) Fan/Bulbs/Tube light
(ii)Fridge
(iii)Other appliances
7 Jewellery
8 Other Durables
How much time does it take you on average to get (using the transport you use the most often) to the
nearest: (in hours; includes all the time usually spent to get there)
* Main road
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* Telephone that you can use
* Basic health care center
* Hospital
* Bank
* College
[9] Transport Equipment
SI. No. owned as on
no
Item date of survey
1. carts (hand-driven / animal driven)
2. bicycles
3. Rickshaws
4. motor cycles/ scooters/ mopeds/ auto-rickshaws
5. motor cars/jeep/van
6. trucks/light comm. vehicles (LCV)/ passenger buses
7. tractor/ trailers/
8. Boats
9. other transport equipment
10. total ( items 1 to 9)
[10]Financial Assets (Other than shares and debentures) as on date of Survey
Sl. Item Yes/No Value
1. government certificates viz. NSC , Indira vikas patra, kisan vikas patra,
2. deposit in post office including national saving scheme deposits
3. Ideposit in co-operative society/Co-operative bank
4. deposit in commercial bank (SBI, Regional Rural Bank etc)
5. Deposit in self-help group (SHG)
6. Pensions/provident fund
7. cash in hand
8. other financial assets
[11] Cash Loans outstanding
whether any cash Source Purpose of Amount
loan outstanding on (Code) Loan Outstanding
the date of survey (Code) (in Rs)
101
Codes for Block 11
Source
Institutional: government -01, co-operative society/bank -02, commercial bank including regional
rural bank -03, insurance -04, provident fund -05, financial corporation/institution-06, financial
company-07, other institutional agencies -08,
Non-Institutional: landlord -09, agricultural money lender - 10, professional money lender -11,
trader -12, relatives and friends -13, doctors, lawyers and other professionals - 14, others- 99
Purpose of Loan
expenditure in farm business - 1, expenditure in non farm business -2, other household expenditure -3,
other expenditure --9
102
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